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## Near East/South Asia Report

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FORMER ECONOMIC MINISTER'S CONTINUING ROLE DISCUSSED

Riyadh AL-YAMAMAH in Arabic 17 Apr 85 pp 48-49

[Article by Muhammad Barakat: "The Story of the Struggle Between the Economy Minister and the Open-Door Policy Mafia; Egyptian Economy Minister: 'Prosecute Me!'" ]

[Text] The Egyptian economy minister, Dr Mustafa al-Sa'id, left the ministry after resigning (or being dismissed), but he has not yet left the ruling establishment, as he is still a member of the People's Assembly and still an official in the General Secretariat of the ruling National Democratic Party.

Throughout the period of his presence in the ministry, Dr Mustafa al-Sa'id caused a storm over the Egyptian economy, an economy that is sick because of a series of decisions that he made and desperately defended, until he paid for them with his office.

As is well-known, Egypt's problems are complex and many; the most important and serious of them, however, is the economic problem. Within the Egyptian government, therefore, the economy minister is considered one of the dominant ministers, if not the most important of them all.

For the length of 15 years, up to the present time, dozens of economy ministers have succeeded each other in Egypt. In many cases, even the prime minister has been a prominent man of finance and economy. Yet, from Dr 'Abd-al-'Aziz Hijazi to Dr 'Abd-al-Raziq 'Abd-al-Majid, though all were prominent university professors, all have failed in treating the "sick man" called the Egyptian economy.

Briefly, the problem of the Egyptian economy is that Egypt produces immeasurably less than it consumes, and that the burdens laid upon the back of the government are much greater than the available resources. The economic problem in Egypt has therefore become a political problem casting its shadow on everyone from the president of the republic to the least important official.

The National [Democratic] Party government has made efforts to analyze the dimensions of the problem and to set out solutions for it, just as the parties

of the opposition have made efforts to set forth their conception of the crisis and the way to get out of it.

The National Party holds the view that the entire problem resides in the fact that production is less than the target that ought to be realized. The parties of the opposition, with the exception of the Wafd Party, hold the view that the economic open-door policy (an open-door for consumption, not for production) is the immediate cause of the transformation of the Egyptian economy from independence to dependency.

Under the shadow of this economic open-door policy, Egypt has turned from a producer nation into a consumer one, and a parasitic class of people has appeared, people who have made millions of Egyptian pounds in middleman and brokerage transactions, smuggling and currency dealing. These are the people whom the Ethics Court has named "the Open-Door Mafia."

This is the class that has sucked the blood of Egyptian society and become exceedingly wealthy. At the same time, it has impoverished millions of Egyptians and lowered the living standard of entire classes of them, creating between the classes of Egyptian society disparities that threaten to endanger social peace.

Given this situation, the condition of the Egyptian economy has become almost hopeless, weighted down as it is with debts, burdens, and demands. The job of the Egyptian economy minister has for this reason become so extremely difficult that it requires either a hero like Erhardt, or a martyr like Dr Mustafa al-Sa'id.

Dr Mustafa al-Sa'id's problem with both the office and the ministry began at the moment he decided to confront the "Open-Door Mafia" of currency dealers and the black market.

At that time--in August 1983, to be precise--the minister decided to lock the accounts of a group of currency dealers who were earning hundreds of millions in the black market. By lowering the price of the Egyptian pound at the same time as they were raising the price of the dollar daily, they were controlling the capacities of the Egyptian economy.

After this measure had been taken, the biggest economic court case in Egyptian history began. The case was known as "the currency dealers' case," and it included 20 persons--currency dealers, as well as officials from three investment banks: al-Ahram Bank, Jammal Trust Bank, and the Egyptian National Bank. Foremost among the accused was "Egypt's dollar king," Sami 'Ali Hasan, who dealt annually in more than \$2 million. The indictment included three principal charges: [illegal] currency trading, illegal foreign currency exports, and speculation in gold and precious metals.

The trial lasted 6 full months before the Ethics Court, a political court. Present at it were 30 lawyers, headed by Ahmad al-Khawajah, president of the Lawyers' Union. The court issued its decisions last week, and the judgment included five accusations directed at the economy minister. The day after

the judgments were issued, Dr Mustafa al-Sa'id tendered his resignation (or was dismissed from office), and Dr Sultan Abu 'Ali was appointed to replace him as economy minister.

The truth, however, is that Dr Mustafa al-Sa'id, the economy minister who caused such a storm during the last months, did not leave the ministry on account of the judgment of the Ethics Court; he left because of a series of well-known decisions he issued 3 months ago, decisions which have become known as "the decisions of 5 January."

What were these decisions that were attacked by all public figures from the extreme right to the extreme left, from currency dealers to the prime minister of Egypt, and which led, as a practical matter, to the fall of the economy minister himself?

These decisions were:

1. Cancellation of all restrictions on foreign currency bank deposits by Egyptians.
2. The assumption by the commercial banks active in Egypt of the function of collecting the savings by Egyptians working abroad, and working toward the goal of eliminating the activity of currency dealers.
3. The ending of importation without currency conversion--a system without parallel anywhere in the world, East or West--except for materials required for production.
4. Limitation of imports, by means of Import Guidance Committees.
5. The setting of a flexible exchange rate for the purchase of dollars from citizens.

Immediately upon the issuance of these decisions, groups of great size and influence began to organize to oppose them and to oppose and attack the economy minister himself. Even though the economy minister explained his policy in all newspapers and magazines and asked to be given a chance for the decisions to be tested in the real world, the opposition front was too strong. It included among its forces:

--The prime minister, Kamal Hasan 'Ali, a number of leaders of the ruling party, the chairman of the economics committee of the National Party, and many National Party members in the People's Assembly;

--Leaders of the foreign, joint, and private banks, some of which are headed by former ministers or former prime ministers;

--Large importers and businessmen;

--The official press, called the "national press";

--The leaders of the Wafd Party, and the newspaper AL-WAFD.

this meant that there was no one to defend the decisions of 5 January except the economy minister, Mustafa al-Sa'id, and the National [Progressive Unionist] Grouping Party, with its newspaper AL-AHALI.

Throughout these months, these decisions and their opponents, a very strong front, set about interacting in the real world of Egypt in the kind of mortal struggle which the sick body of the Egyptian economy could not bear.

In the 100 days between the issuance of the decisions and the fall of the economy minister, a long list of errors or accusations, real or fictitious, accumulated. These were errors, it was said, that threatened the Egyptian economy with real disaster, the immediate cause of which was said to be the policies of Dr. Mustafa al-Sa'id.

These "errors" can be summarized in the following points:

1. The Ethics Court said that documents in the dossier of the currency dealers' case have revealed that the economy minister, before becoming minister, had stood security for certain persons and had obtained credit facilitations; also, that there were dealings fraught with many improprieties between companies in which his wife and certain of his relatives held shares and the banks.
2. The economy minister had extended his authority over the Central Bank--the "bank of banks," as it is called--and over the public-sector banks, thus paralyzing the hand of the bank and its superintendent, and turning it into a mere department within the Economy Ministry. This was considered a step backward, and the Ethics Court therefore called on those in positions of responsibility to lift the hand of the Economy Ministry from the Central Bank, so that it might fulfill its duty in the banking field far from any influence or variables.
3. The Ethics Court said that the currency dealers whom it called "the Open-Door Mafia" used to collect foreign currencies from the local market, sheltering themselves under the shadow of instructions emanating from the Economy Ministry to the effect that no one was to be arrested while on bank premises. In the wake of this decision by the economy minister, the men responsible for combatting currency smuggling were unable to arrest currency dealers, even though they were causing havoc among the banks and disturbing the foundations of the national economy.
4. One of the major defendants in the currency dealers' case, 'Abd-al-Rahman Barakah, director of al-Ahram Bank and vice-director of the Hong Kong Bank, and who smuggled \$500 million out of the country, has family ties to the economy minister. Did this important man exploit this relationship in these gigantic smuggling operations?
5. The economy minister issued a decision on 8 August 1983 locking the accounts of some currency dealers. The Ethics Court said that this decision

was "a setback" for the Egyptian economy, as it was issued flawed with deficiencies; furthermore, that the circumstances of its issuance were surrounded with suspicion; and that the minister's issuance of it did not aim at the public interest, but was motivated by hidden ends known only to the person who issued it. The affair led to confusion in the currency, a shortage of foreign currency imports, and a rise in their price.

Beside these five accusations directed at the economy minister by the Ethics Court in its well-known judgment issued last week, there is another list of accusations brought forward by economists, businessmen and practical reality. Among these accusations are the following:

1. Import movement from abroad at the level of essential and non-essential food commodities stopped, or nearly stopped, after the Import Guidance Committees were unable to reach a decision in tens of thousands of applications presented to them.
2. The market price of many food commodities rose, and other commodities disappeared because demand for them rose after the halting of their importation.
3. Domestic trade experienced a slowdown, as well as an increase in food commodities held in storage.
4. The inflow of remittances from Egyptians [working abroad] dropped.
5. Investment movement in Egypt dropped during these months.
6. The import of production-required commodities, or of a large part of them, stopped.
7. The foreign banks stopped, or almost stopped, operating; some of them threatened to close their branches in Egypt.

Even more important than all these errors and accusations is the fact that the currency dealers have not been eliminated, the black market has not disappeared, and the rise in the price of the dollar has not ceased. Quite the opposite has happened: the currency dealers are still around, and the rise of the price of the dollar has continued, reaching 1.43 Egyptian pounds.

The goal of the economic decisions issued by the minister was: "that the banking system should replace the currency dealers in providing for the foreign currency needs of the importing private sector; that the banking system alone should manage these foreign currencies at a flexible price capable of daily variation; and that importers should pay the price of what they import in Egyptian pounds."

Did this happen?

The facts say no.

Is it because the decisions were wrong? Is it because the minister departed from the line he had agreed upon with the prime minister and the other ministers concerned?

Minister Mustafa al-Sa'id says that his decisions were sound, that the interest of Egypt and its economy was their aim, and that his real battle is not with the decisions, or with their interpretation, or even with their results; his battle is with the currency dealers and the "Open-Door Mafia." They are the class that is mounting the battle against him and against the decisions of 5 January.

As for the government, represented by Prime Minister Kamal Hasan 'Ali and by the writers of the national press, they say that the economy minister agreed on one thing and did another, and that the decisions he made and which caused all this confusion in the Egyptian economy for 100 days and nearly ended in disaster were purely his private "independent judgment," an expression only of the minister himself, and not an interpretation of government policy in the area.

12937  
CSO: 4504/330

EGYPT

PASSAGE OF 1979 PERSONAL STATUS LAW REVIEWED

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 7 May 85 pp 1, 5

[Article by Hisam-al-Din Salih]

[Text] Last Saturday the Supreme Constitutional Court made its statement on personal status law; it ruled that decree law No 44 of 1979 concerning amendments to certain provisions of the personal status law was unconstitutional because it had been issued contrary to the provisions of Article 147 of the constitution. This item allows the president of the republic to issue, in an emergency and the absence of the People's Assembly, decrees that have the power of law, that during circumstances that demand quick action without delay. However, the constitution was careful to put curbs and restraints on this emergency power to make sure that it would not be put to unlimited legislative use that would invalidate the principle of separation of powers.

Because of this, and because the element of necessity that would justify the issuance of this decree law did not exist, the court ruled that it was unconstitutional, and that means that the emergency power was used improperly.

The People's Assembly elections had taken place, and 23 June 1979 had been set as the date for the new assembly to convene (third legislative term, first session). On 20 June 1979 this decree law was issued by the presidency of the republic, that is, just 3 days before the new assembly convened.

During its session on 3 July 1979, this decree law was presented to the People's Assembly to be passed.

It is well known that a decree law differs from a bill, for with a bill the members of the People's Assembly can introduce any amendments that might be more suitable or better. But the decree law is a higher form that cannot be touched; either it is accepted as a whole or rejected as a whole, and the members of the People's Assembly are not allowed to introduce any amendments to any of its items.

According to the minutes of this session on 3 July 1979, to which the decree law was presented for passage (pp 131, 132), Engineer Ibrahim Shukri stressed in his statement to the People's Assembly that he was not against making changes in personal status law in principle, since there were things that

should be changed in the interest of the family, but it should not be done so simply. The proper way to do it would not be to pass a law that would put us in these difficult straits, but to propose changes that would be presented to the People's Assembly, so that a "free" debate could take place in which all points of view could "participate," with the aim of arriving at what is most appropriate and in keeping with the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah.

Ibrahim Shukri ended his statement by saying: "All the decree laws that we have seen have involved some urgency, but with respect to this decree law, I only see doubtful urgency. I would like to hear from the government what urgent situation forced the cabinet to meet and decide on this decree, to be issued the following day and to be obligatory for us? How can that be acceptable when we were starting a new legislative term? I would like to hear an explanation from the government that would justify our standing thus with arms folded before a decree that affects all the people of Egypt."

The minister of state for People's Assembly affairs at that time, Muhammad Hilmi 'Abd-al-Akhar, replied, insisting that he did not think that the matter needed explanation, and he described that position of the leader of the opposition as that of a skeptic, not one seeking an explanation. "Besides, we affirm that issuing a decree law is a right the head of state has in the absence of the Assembly concerning something he considers to be an emergency, and experts on constitutional law have agreed that this emergency is something the head of state decides on , as he has the confidence of the people."

Is the overwhelming majority to have the last word? Are the jurists to be absorbed into the ranks of this majority? That is the hard lesson.

12547  
CSO: 4504/375

EGYPT

SECURITY FORCES' ACTION AT SYNAGOGUE CRITICIZED

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 21 May 85 p 1

[Editorial by Hamid Zaydan]

[Text] The Egyptian people have the right to say no if Israel wants to turn the Jewish synagogue in Cairo into a political center for its political activity in Egypt.

Lamis Hilmi Salim (5 years old) has the right to say no with her mother, who said no to Israel. Even if the central security forces believe that they have the authority to arrest her mother because they believed that she was blocking traffic in 'Adli Street (!!), they do not have the authority to detain a little 5-year old girl for long hours in the police station of Madinat Nasr, along with her mother who was arrested at an Egyptian demonstration in the heart of Cairo.

It was not the intention of any citizen, man or woman, to block traffic in 'Adli Street, or to stand in the way of worshippers going to the synagogue. However, there is no doubt that every citizen has the right to express his opinion repudiating any foreign attempt to turn a place of worship into the political center of a foreign state, not to mention it being the political center of a state that has been hostile towards the Arabs for many long years, and still is.

Israel's crimes against humanity in Palestine and Lebanon cannot possibly give it the right to do what no other foreign nation does on the soil of another state.

The massacres that Israel perpetrated against the Arab people of Palestine and Lebanon cannot possibly justify its turning an Egyptian place of worship into a center for it as a foreign nation, where it holds political celebrations.

What Israel has failed to achieve through killing and terror, conquest and military defeat, it cannot possibly achieve under the cloak of political relations or normal relations. In Cairo there are embassies of dozens of countries that do not pursue such an unacceptable course as that, holding a political celebration in a place reserved for worship.

What came from Egyptian youth in 'Adli Street was a statement in opposition to Israel, and it proved that the Egyptian people are able to say no, that they are able to state publically the facts of their political position rejecting the establishment of normal relations with a foreign state that to this day still carries out acts of murder and terror against the Arab people in Lebanon, not to mention the fact that it is still occupying Arab lands in Palestine, Syria, Lebanon and the Taba territory in Egypt.

12547

CSO: 4504/375

MOROCCO

ACTIVITIES OF TWO LIBYAN INSTITUTIONS SURVEYED

National Markets Association

Rabat L'OPINION in French 11 May 85 pp 5, 6

[Text] To speak about the National Markets Association is to start a discussion about one of the main accomplishments of the 1 September Revolution, namely, the abolition of the illegal trade that was carried out by the private sector.

Commerce was previously subjected to personal interests, either those of the merchants and importers who monopolized the goods and set prices and whose only concern was to show the greatest possible profits. Given such a legacy, once the people had overthrown the government and disposed of its wealth and weapons, it became necessary to finalize a marketing system that would sell goods at cost without taking into account the profits which were the *raison d'être* of the exploiters.

This system was established as the National Markets Association, following the decision of the People's General Committee, dated 12 February 1979, to create a National Markets Association.

Its main objectives were:

- 1) To be responsible for supplying the market with various consumers goods, their equitable distribution through specialized markets, complexes and other commercial establishments to be built and managed;
- 2) to create and manage ordinary and cold-storage warehouses and set up emergency stocks based on modern methods;
- 3) to purchase consumers and other goods from local market or to import them from fraternal and friendly countries, giving priority to the marketing of local commodities and agricultural and industrial products;
- 4) to train future public market managers who would oversee their preservation and development.

It was imperative for the National Markets Association to cover the entire Jamahiriyyah.

The National Markets Association began its administrative activities, i.e., marketing, distribution and storage, with a capital of 50 million dinars, with the possibility of increasing it. Three agencies were opened (Tripoli, Bengali and Sabha). The Association carried out its activities through them until the beginning of 1980, after which, it felt the need to enlarge its marketing and warehousing. Consequently, three other agencies were added (An Noukat al-Khums, Darnah and Misratah), raising to six the number of Association agencies.

The capital was raised to 86.5 million dinars in 1981. An agency was created in Jabal Gharbi in 1982.

The Association continued its work with seven agencies until 1984. That year, another agency was set up in Tarhunah.

The agencies have administrative offices, warehouses, markets and shops spread throughout the municipalities of the Jamahiriya. In record time, 1,800 markets, shops and distribution centers were opened, totaling 905,073 square meters, with shops of all sizes.

The table of organization of the National Markets Association includes an administration, services and units in addition to that of the agencies, which includes bureaus, services and units.

The duties of the National Markets Association may be defined as follows:

#### 1.. The Executive Committee

Within the framework of popular rule, the National Markets Association is headed by an executive committee which includes the secretaries of the people's economic and industrial committees of some municipalities as well as technicians and specialists from Karioun University and the secretary of the people's economic and light industry committee. The executive committee consists of a secretary and a deputy secretary and seven other members, namely:

- 1) The secretary of the people's economic and light industry committee of Benghazi;
- 2) the secretary of the people's economic and light industry committee of Sabah;
- 3) the secretary of the people's economic and light industry committee of Tripoli;
- 4) the secretary of the people's economic and light industry committee of Suq al-Jin;
- 5) the secretary of the people's economic and light industry committee of Noukat al-Khums;
- 6) a member of Karioun University, school of economics and commerce; and
- 7) a member of the people's general economic and light industry committee.

The committee's duties include:

implementing the decisions and recommendations of the primary people's congresses concerning the activities of the Association;

formulating the general policy of the Association, setting goals and ensuring their implementation;

revising Association policies based on its regular meetings;

signing contracts with third parties for investments and materials or technical assistance such as to improve the performance of the Association;

drafting internal regulation making it possible to ensure coordination, assignment of duties and determination of responsibilities.

## 2. The General Directorate

The seat of the general directorate of the National Markets Association is located at the Dahra-Fachloum intersection in Tripoli. It is also the headquarters of the executive committee.

The general directorate consists of several administrations and bureaus, namely:

Administrations:

- 1) Commercial Affairs Administration;
- 2) Financial Affairs Administration;
- 3) Technical Affairs Administration; and
- 4) Administrative Affairs and Services Administration.

Bureaus:

- 1) Security and Control Bureau;
- 2) Planning and Follow-Up Bureau;
- 3) Data Processing Bureau;
- 4) Internal Auditing Bureau; and
- 5) Legal Counsel Bureau.

Through its administrations and bureaus, the directorate general handles:

- a) Marketing and consumer demand studies; determining the best selling products in each locality; and drafting contracts for domestic or foreign purchases and contract follow-ups;

- b) accounting, drafting budget estimates, bookkeeping and general budgeting;
- c) drawing up charts, diagrams and other documents relative to the projects of the Association; suggesting methods for the development of markets and warehouses; studying the needs of the Association for spare parts and operational requirements;
- d) studying the table of organization of the Association; recruiting cadres; regulating duties; and planning training programs at home and abroad;
- e) drafting annual reports for all the activities of the Association, based on studies and research made by the planning bureau; drafting bulletins to raise the awareness of the employees of the Association and the public so that the Association may be profitable.

### 3. Agencies and Bureaus

Agencies	Bureaus
1 Tripoli	Tripoli-Aziza
2 Benghazi	Benghazi, Fath, Ajdabiya, Kufrah
3 Noukat al-Khums	Noukat al-Khums, al-Zawiyah
4 Darnah	Darnah, Jadu, Nalut
5 Jabal Gharbi	Gharyan, Jadu, Nalut
6 Sabha	al-Bayda', al-Shati, Oubari, Marzuq
7 Tarhunah	Tarhunah, al-Khums, Suq al-Jin
8 Misratah	Misratah, Zulaytin, Surt, Jafrah

### 4. Markets

Once launched, the National Markets Association began operations, trained its cadres and outlined its program. It then opened its first 2,100 square meter market on 1 August 1979 in Ghouta Chaalane in Tripoli. This marked the opening of a chain of markets of all kinds and in all areas throughout the Jamahiriyyah; they became what they are today, shops offering all sorts of consumers' goods.

Following is a survey of these markets:

- A. Department stores with several specialized floors divided into aisles selling:
  - 1) groceries;
  - 2) clothing (men's and children's);
  - 3) women's clothing;
  - 4) shoes;
  - 5) small appliances;
  - 6) toys;
  - 7) cosmetics and perfumery; and
  - 8) furniture.

There is also a pharmacy and shoe repair shop.

So far, eight department stores, five of which in Tripoli, have been opened:

- 1) Hay Andalous;
- 2) Jamahiriya;
- 3) Toulata;
- 4) Jounoua; and
- 5) Ain Zara.

Three others are located in Benghazi:

- 1) 2 March;
- 2) Fath;
- 3) Jamahiriya.

The first store, the Andalous, was opened in Tripoli on 22 March 1981.

B. Two-level markets. Groceries, cosmetics and perfumery are sold on the first floor and appliances, men's, women's and children's clothing and shoes on the second.

They have a floor space of 4,000 square meters. There are 32 such markets. The first one was opened before 20 January 1980 in Zalaytin.

C. One hundred and twenty-two light-weight-structure markets selling groceries, clothing, shoes and perfumery with a floor space of 1,500 square meters each. The first of these markets was opened on 1 August 1979 in Tripoli.

D. Nine hundred and eighteen specialized markets and distribution centers.

Specialized markets have aisles for clothing, shoes and appliances. Their floor space ranges from 120 to 300 square meters. There are 1,127 such markets in the Jamahiriya.

There also are 507 other small shops depending on the markets which supply them regularly with goods. It was decided to set up such markets in order to put consumers' goods at the disposal of the population.

Let us also point out that 246 shops are under construction, of which 128 have light-weight structures and 118 more durable ones.

Markets of all types and sizes were opened during 1983.

#### Warehouses and Storage

This large number of markets, shops, distribution centers and supermarkets requires a large warehouse network to handle their needs.

The National Markets Association therefore opened modern warehouses in:

- 1) Aziza, with 20,000 square meters;
- 2) Hashanah, with 25,000 square meters;
- 3) Benghazi, with 20,000 square meters;
- 4) al-Khums Noukat, with 10,000 square meters; and
- 5) Darnah, with 10,000 square meters.

The total floor space of these warehouses is 85,000 square meters, which allowed the closing of several small warehouses made up of small shops unsuitable for storage.

Good marketing practices demanded setting up good storage facilities in order to allow the Association to put the needed goods at the disposal of the population at the proper time and site.

The following table shows the main existing warehouses and those under construction as part of the main warehousing program.

Agence (1)	Super- marché (2)	Marché 2 étages (3)	Marché d'un étage (4)	Marché en matériaux légers(5)	Marché spécialisé (6)	Total
1- Tripoli	1	2	1	2	7	13
2- Benghazi	—	—	—	11	6	17
3- Noukat Khams (7)	—	—	—	9	5	14
4- Misrata (8)	—	2	2	1	1	6
5- Darna (9)	—	—	—	4	4	8
6- Jbel Gharbi (10)	—	2	—	3	7	12
7- Sabha	—	—	—	3	6	9
8- Tarhouna (11)	—	—	—	—	13	13
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>92</b>

1. Agency; 2. supermarket; 3. two-floor market; 4. one-floor market; 5. light-weight structure market; 6. specialized market; 7. Noukat al-Khums; 8. Misratah; 9. Darnah; 10. Jabal Gharbi; 11. Tarhunah.

#### Distribution

Goods are checked for quality after their arrival in Libyan ports. They are then distributed among the agencies and bureaus in quantities based on volume of sales and population density.

The distribution rates based on studies are as follows:

Agence (1)	Taux agence	Bureau (2)	(3) Taux bureau
Tripoli	32 %	Centre de l'agence (4) Aziza	94 % 6 %
Benghazi	23 %	Centre de l'agence (4) Fatih (5) Ajdabia (6) Kufrah (7)	72 % 12 % 12 % 4%
Noukat Khams (8)	10 %	Centre agence Zaouia (9)	53 % 47 %
Darna (10)	9 %	Centre agence Bida (11) Tabrak(12)	36 % 34 % 30 %
Masrana (13)	8 %	Centre agence Sirt (14) Salit	42 % 22 % 25 %
Jbel Gharbi (15)	7 %	Centre Agence Jadou (16) Nabout (17)	50 % 27 % 23 %
Sebha (18)	6 %	Centre agence Chatii (22) Oubari Marzak(19)	45 % 22 % 19 % 16 %
Tarhouna (20)	5 %	Centre agence Khemis Souk Jine (21)	3 % 46 % 21 %

1. Agency; 2. agency rate; 3. bureau rate; 4. agency center;
5. Fath; 6. Ajdabiya; 7. Kufrah; 8. Noukat al-Khums;
9. al-Zawiyah; 10. Darnah; 11. al-Bayda'; 12. Tubruq;
13. Misratah; 14. Surt; 15. Jabal Gharbi; 16. Jadu;
17. Nalut; 18. Sabha; 19. Marzuq; 20. Tarhunah; 21. Suq al-Jin; 22. al-Shati.

As soon as goods are received they are shipped to the warehouses. Reception is acknowledged after they have been unloaded. They are then distributed among the bureaus and agencies according to set rates, and bearing in mind that all the towns and villages of the Jamahiriyyah must be supplied. The warehouse administration then sees to their distribution among the markets, shops and distribution centers.

#### Operations, Transportation and Handling

The Socialist Libyan Arab Jamahiriyyah covers an area of 1,749 million square kilometers. This necessitates a large motor fleet for the transportation of goods to the warehouses, agencies, bureaus and markets of the Association. Shipping prices must be uniform.

The transportation and unloading operations are very important. A professional transport company was therefore created within the National Markets Association.

The following table shows the number of vehicles and their load capacity;

AGENCE (1)	NOMBRE DE VOITURE (2)	CHARGE (en tonnes) (3)
1 Tripoli	636	2.583
2 Benghazi	385	2.564
3 Noukat Khams (4)	199	773.5
4 Darna (5)	240	1.457
5 Masrana (6)	155	1.820
6 JBel Gharbi (7)	298	504
7 Sabha	149	1.488
8 Tarhouna (8)	55	290
TOTAL	2117	11.479,5

1. Agency; 2. number of vehicles; 3. load (in tons);  
4. Noukat al-Khums; 5. Darnah; 6. Misratah; 7. Jabal  
Gharbi; 8. Tarhunah.

#### Maintenance

These markets must be kept in order so that they may fulfill their purpose under proper conditions and may last as long as possible.

The technical directorate of the National Markets Association plays an important role in this operation.

It makes the necessary technical studies for maintaining the markets and warehouses. It estimates the needs for spare parts and equipment.

It is also in charge of construction and controls its implementation.

Thus, a maintenance service was set up within the Association. This service handles the upkeep of the markets, warehouses, electric wiring, air conditioning and cleaning of the administrative building and its offices.

Following is a list of simple maintenance work performed:

Maintenance of electric motors;  
repair of scales, calculating machines and cash registers;  
repair of elevators and ladders;  
building of shelves and other display facilities; and  
building of doors and sales windows.

#### Data Processing

In the field of data processing, the Association has 24 of the most advanced micro-computers. The development of data processing began in 1983 at the Andalous store. The Jemaa, Toulata and Jamahiriya stores were next, to be followed in the near future by other markets and agencies.

The introduction of data processing has had good results on the services rendered by the National Markets Association.

All accounting operations have been mastered, as well as operations dealing with; daily commercial and financial activity in the markets; inventoring; payroll; personnel records; computing taxes; and accounting and statistics.

This proves that the National Markets Association watches over the quality of its services.

#### Training and Qualification

The objectives of the National Markets Association include personnel training and improvement of services.

All levels of training were therefore set so as to train cadres competent to head the management and set the course of the people's markets. Over 600 persons were thus trained at home and abroad.

##### A. Training Abroad

Last year, 88 trainees were assigned to training in fraternal and friendly countries:

Maintenance and data processing, in Great Britain; market management, in Yugoslavia and Spain; administration and supermarket organization, in France; administration and warehouse organization, in Finland; and maintenance of ladders and elevators.

##### B. Training at Home

Several training programs were organized within the Jamahiriya:

Data processing;  
English language;  
warehousing;  
air conditioning, refrigeration, electricity and machine maintenance; and finance and accounting.

The Association set up a center in Tripoli, for management and maintenance training; it also participates in the training sessions sponsored by the National Institute of Management and the Banking School.

Table 3000.

Per capita sales by the National Markets Association averages 128 dinars a year. The share per household is 641 dinars a year.

This is a brief survey of the National Markets Association and its economic and social obligations. It supervises a large share of domestic production, both agricultural and industrial, through its various markets. It also controls imports of some products marketed alongside national products at cost. The Association also fulfills a social purpose by training new cadres for managing the business of the Association. It also organizes training for employees at home and abroad.

#### General Data on the Association

Agence (1)	Nombre de marchés (2)	Magasins (3)	Superficie (4) des marchés	Nombre des dépôts (5)	Superficie des dépôts (6)	Nombre de camions (7)	Capacité en tonne (8)	Nombre des employés (9)
1- Tripoli	156	226	352114	14	71100	636	2583	4716
2- Benghazi	153	193	201549	39	101082	385	2564	4416
3-Noukat Khams (10)	174	88	51603	33	42658	199	773,5	1968
4- Darna (11)	108	—	68271	18	27000	240	1457	2361
5- Misratah (12)	105	—	58097	23	26401	155	1820	1242
6- Jbel Gharbi (13)	170	—	74991	8	12300	298	504	1682
7- Sabha	144	—	56396	11	21500	149	1488	1312
8- Tarhouna (14)	117	—	42052	15	16976	55	290	691
<b>Total</b>	<b>1127</b>	<b>507</b>	<b>905073</b>	<b>161</b>	<b>319017</b>	<b>2117</b>	<b>11479,5</b>	<b>18388</b>

1. Agency; 2. number of markets; 3. shops; 4. floor space of the markets;
5. number of warehouses; 6. floor space of the warehouses; 7. number of trucks;
8. capacity in tons; 9. number of employees; 10. Noukat al-Khums; 11. Darnah;
12. Misratah; 13. Jabal Gharbi; 14. Tarhunah.

Sales, Per Capita and Per Household

Agence (1)	Valeur des ventes en dinar (2)	Population	Part de l'individu dinar/an (3)	Nombre des ménages (4)	Part des ménages dinar/an (5)
1- Tripoli	153079153	1186000	129	237100	645
2- Benghazi	110153906	792000	139	185400	695
3- Noukat Khams (6)	45639728	377000	121	75400	605
4- Darna (7)	41867259	335000	124	67000	624
5- Misratah (8)	33410232	325200	102	65040	513
6- Jbel Gharbi (9)	34387133	244900	140	48980	702
7- Sabha (10)	32684581	179000	182	35800	912
8- Tarhouna (11)	23034936	2500600	87	50120	439
Total	473256928	3690000	128	738000	641

1. Agency; 2. Amount of sales in dinars; 3. per capita, in dinars/per year;
4. number of households; 5. per household, in dinars/per year; 6. Noukat al-Khums; 7. Darnah; 8. Misratah; 9. Jarbal Gharbi; 10. Sabha; 11. Tarhunah.

Arab-Libyan Foreign Bank

Rabat L'OPINION in French 11 May 85 p 7

[Text] The Arab Libyan Foreign Bank [BALE] is the single financial institution of the Socialist People's Arab Jamahiriya authorized to perform banking activities, freely.

The international economic crisis, manifested through economic stagnation, a drop in production and renewed unemployment, directly affects petroleum consumption and prices on international markets. This had inevitable repercussions on the economy of petroleum exporting countries, their surpluses and, consequently, their development plans, balances of payment, amount of aid to Third World countries and investment abroad. Taking into consideration that petroleum surplus revenue is the main resources of the international banks, including the Arab-Libyan Foreign Bank, the international economic situation contributed to the BALE's change in policy in a new direction. It sought to participate in other economic activities for the purpose of diversifying its resources. Thus, it became involved in the international collaterals sector and in short- and average-term loans to international companies operating in Arab areas, with good international guarantees.

The Bank also continued to support financial institutions through its foreign operations in order to be able to achieve its goals and continue to increase the volume of its transactions, determined by the specific conditions governing capital operations in accordance with the regulation of the countries in which these banks operate, in order to be competitive on the international markets.

Transactions of the Arab-Libyan Foreign Bank during 1983 totaled 61,209,861 dinars as compared to 54,773,607 dinars in 1982, or a 12 percent increase. The transactions amount to 7.8 percent of the bank's overall investments.

Operations have begun to yield income from long-term investments. The 1983 income reached 9 percent of the total amount of operations. Likewise, revenue from such operations was 11 percent of the total for that year.

Deposits also increased by 578,418,010 dinars in 1982 to 673,563,681 dinars in 1983 or by 16.5 percent, amounting to 85.3 percent of the overall resources.

As to the deposits proper, they increased from 81,200,000 dinars in 1982 to 87,950,000 dinars in 1983, or by 8.4 percent. They account for 11.2 percent of the overall resources.

Taxable profits amounted to 16,886,865 dinars or a 56.3 percent return on investments.

The net profit was 9,084,285 dinars or a capital return of 30.3 percent.

Let us recall that the Arab-Libyan Foreign Bank is one of the accomplishments of the 1 September Revolution. It was founded in 1972 with cadres from the Central Bank. The choice of the Central Bank was a shrewd one, for the team entrusted with founding the BALE was made up of an expert and experienced elite. Through its efforts, the bank was established for the purpose of entering the international financial markets.

The Foreign Bank has met with great success since its establishment. It consolidated its relations with all financial markets and opened branches in several fraternal and friendly countries through stock participation. There are 21 branches located in Nouakchott, N'Jamena, Kampala, Beirut, Cairo, Paris, Abu Dhabi, Manama, Istanbul, Laome, Tunis, Hong Kong, Oman, Athens, Niame, Bamako, Madrid, Rome, London and New York.

It has purchased varying amounts of shares in several financial institutions, such as those in Bahrain, Abu Dhabi, Hong Kong, etc.

The Libyan Foreign Bank plays a very important role for it invests in international financial markets and its revenues are in foreign exchange.

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SUDAN

REPORTS FROM KHARTOUM, INTERVIEWS, ANALYSIS

Al-Tijani al-Tayyib

Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 8 May 85 p 10

/Interview with al-Tijani al-Tayyib, member of the Politburo of the Sudanese Communist Party, by Amina al-Naqqash: "How Are the Sudanese Communists Thinking? The Muslim Brotherhood Was the Only Force Absent from the 26 March Uprising"; date and place not given/

/Text/ In the last two issues of AL-AHALI, we published in succession reports from colleague Amina al-Naqqash about events in Khartoum between 26 March and 9 April 1985. These reports included conversations and interviews with most of those who played influential roles in the Sudanese uprising. In this issue, we publish the latest of the reports that have reached us from Khartoum. These include two interviews: with al-Tijani al-Tayyib, a member of the Politburo of the Sudanese Communist Party, and with al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, leader of the Ummah Party. Also included are analyses of the stand of the political forces in the Sudan on two issues: the South, and integration with Egypt. AL-AHALI hopes that it will in this way have given its readers an exact picture of conditions in our sister country, the Sudan, as seen through Sudanese eyes. This is what AL-AHALI did before the uprising and what it shall always do; for we believe that preservation of the deep friendship and interests that bind the Nile Valley should begin with seeing things from the Sudan's point of view.

The Sudanese Communist Party is one of the most powerful communist parties in the Arab world and Africa. It was founded in August 1946. In the period before independence, it played important parts, the most prominent being its espousal of the rallying cry, "unity of the common Egyptian-Sudanese struggle," instead of the rallying cry, "unity of Egypt and the Sudan under the crown of Faruq." The Sudanese communists were innovators in methods of political movement and action, forging a harmony between the special character of the Sudanese people and their own vision and political programs.

With its class perspective and its espousal of causes linked to popular groups, the Communist Party was the nationalist force most unflagging in the Sudan's battles against colonialism and dependency and in the Arab nation's battles against Zionism and imperialism.

Al-Tijani al-Tayyib, a member of the Politburo of the Sudanese Communist Party, received his education at the Engineering College of Cairo University. In 1948, he was imprisoned for a year in Egypt. Afterwards, he left for the Sudan, where he was subjected to imprisonment several times. The latest of these was in November 1980. He remained imprisoned until his release in the wake of the uprising of last 26 March, having spent five continuous years in prison.

#### Religion and the Progressive Movement

Al-Tijani al-Tayyib says: "The inclusion of shaykhs or men of religion in the membership of the Communist Party is no longer a problem. The party made a major swing in that direction after the October 1964 revolution. It came to have representatives in parliament and participated for the first time in government. It could not avoid considering the relations between Islam and social change, or defining a position on the solutions proposed by Islam for social problems; it had to sketch out a way whereby it would avoid either flattering or clashing with religion. In the progressive movement we made use of the enlightened religious heritage and of its progressive solutions generally in order to give impetus to and promote the forces of progress; and on this basis of membership they entered the party."

Question Is the Sudanese left limited to you? What is your relation to its other groups?

Answer From an early time we have called for a national democratic front to put forward a program of national salvation and to include all the forces of the left, as represented in the Nasserites, the Ba'thists, the Revolutionary Committees, some of the New Left tendencies, and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of the Sudan in the south. All of these are independent forces that have adopted socialist thought from various positions other than communist. There are other forces on the left, also outside the party, but historically connected with it, and having no reservations about its program, such as the Trade Union Front among the workers, the Democratic Front among the students, the Union of Farmers and the numerous socialist leagues among physicians, teachers and lawyers. These are non-communist forces with a firm connection with the Communist Party.

'No' to Capitalistic Development

Question Is your program to solve the problems of the Sudan a socialist program, or is it a call for directed capitalism?

/Answer/ We are definitively against the capitalistic path of development. We have a program with a long-term goal and another that is short-term. The former is for the realization of socialism. The latter is a national democratic program that will concern itself with economic, social and cultural development problems by creating conditions that can lead to socialism. We therefore call for the existence of the public sector, even though it is state capitalism; it is, none the less, closer to the development of particular areas in the direction of progress. Likewise, our national democratic program aims at strengthening points of progress that are headed toward socialism.

/Question/ In your estimate, what are the political forces that one might say were more active than others during the uprising of 26 March?

/Answer/ We cannot attribute the people's uprising on 26 March, with all its groups and individual lives, to any single political force in the Sudan. It was an uprising against poverty, misery, and oppression, and the spontaneous element played a large role in it. It came as the result of continuous and patient labor over long years, and as a result of the raising of the rallying cry, "political strike and overthrow of the regime," early on. One might say that the democratic forces in their totality were in the midst of the uprising, and that the one force that was absent from it was the Muslim Brotherhood, since their leadership was in prison and their free elements were not enthusiastic about the uprising. It is not true that what happened occurred because of foreign factors. The arousal and mobilization of the masses and their resolve to overthrow the regime cannot occur because of foreign factors. This fact, however, will not prevent continued Egyptian and American attempt to turn the course of the revolution--but with the existence of a new reality, which is that lasting rule of a single individual will not be able to return in the Sudan.

/Question/ During the days of the uprising, communiques signed in the name of the Free Officers Movement were distributed. What information do you have about it?

/Answer/ Historically, the Free Officers in the Sudan were known to be groups of nationalistic democratic officers close to the Communist Party and to the left in general. During the past 16 years, it would be difficult to count the groups within the army that were imprisoned or liquidated and which belonged to this group of officers, remnants of whose elements do indeed still exist within the army.

#### Betting on the Masses

/Question/ What is your position on military coups?

/Answer/ We are not in principle against coups. We evaluate a coup, after its occurrence, by the forces that participated in bringing it about, and in the framework of whether it was a reactionary or progressive

coup. However, we are against the coup mentality and tactics, and against having the Communist Party base its policies on a coup strategy that neglects mass action and demotes it to secondary rank, so that the coup operation becomes the primary goal. We will absolutely not allow a coup mentality to grow up within the party, or that there be recourse to conspiracy.

We have exerted great effort within the party to root out any thought of that kind. We concentrate on awakening, organizing, and unifying the movement of the masses, and on relying on it in political activity. Any coup that subsequently occurs will be the consummation of the movement of the masses. The coup will strengthen the masses' movement, and in the end it will accept being under its leadership. It will not seek to contain it or to gain ascendancy over it.

The coup that we might undertake would be one that, coming at the time of a popular movement and uprising and a revolutionary wave, would be obedient to it, and not its master.

/Question/ Fourteen years after the coup of Hashim al-'Ata, what are the lessons learned from it?

/Answer/ Basically, we were against the occurrence of the coup. We became convinced, after the consequences that resulted from it, of the damage and unrevolutionariness of the tactics and mentality of the coup. The party's line in refusing that mentality proved to be correct. What also became evident to us was the importance and necessity of intellectual clarity on the part of party members, conscious understanding about the party's program and policies, the necessity for connection with the popular movement and its progressive forces and taking its true pulse, so that we would not have any non-objective estimates of the movement of popular uprising. The mistakes of that period convinced us of the need for goal clarification according to the capability level of the popular movement, and the danger of jumping beyond these capacities.

The picture was not entirely black. Under the circumstances of the bloody persecution throughout 1971, we encountered true backing from the Sudanese people. In spite of the threat of severe punishment for anyone who helped hide a communist, ordinary people acted heroically in hiding us and giving us every assistance. With their help we were able to hide the party leadership cadres. They protected our backs from oppression. Because of such heroism, after the blow of 1971 we did not start from zero. In spite of the severe difficulties faced by the party, whether these involved long periods of imprisonment or the strain placed on its hidden cadres, it was able to preserve its position in all the regions of the Sudan and within all sectors. In spite of the emigration of some of its cadres and the detention of others during the past 14 years because of its activity, the ranks of the party have not seen any divisions or breakdowns during the period. This is what has given us confidence in the extent to which the Sudanese people appreciate our ideas and understand our rallying cries.

Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi

Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 8 May 85 pp 10,6

/Interview with al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, leader of the Ummah Party, by Amina al-Naqqash: "We Will Not Ally Ourselves with the Muslim Brotherhood, which Swore Allegiance to Numayri as Leader and Sold Itself for a Paltry Price"; in Khartoum, date not specified/

/Text/ In the Sudan, it is said that al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, leader of the Ansar order and president of the Ummah Party, is a political leader who knows his religion, not the shaykh of a Sufi order whose leisure time hobby is politics. He understands that Islam, as a movement, is not a turning toward texts, but a method of establishing freedom, equality, and social justice--or what al-Sadiq calls "the socialism of believers."

The Ansar movement, as al-Sadiq al-Mahdi told me, is the contemporary extension of Imam al-Mahdi's revolution in the last century. It considers itself an Islamic movement and a school of thought. Its social base relies on small farmers and cattle-raisers, and it has recently attracted a large proportion of residents of the cities and new community villages.

In the past, the relationship between the Ansar leadership and the Ansar popular base rested on traditional foundations in which historical loyalty played the principal role, and political activity within its ranks was not directed toward the social equation, but rather toward political mobilization and the achievement of independence.

"Now, however, the situation is different. The issue of social justice has come to be in the forefront of our concerns, especially since a large part of the people who form the base of the Ansar are the oppressed of the Sudan and residents in its most backward areas," as al-Sadiq al-Mahdi says.

Against Camp David

I said to al-Sadiq al-Mahdi: "What is the Ummah Party's place on the Sudanese political map? What differentiates its program from that of other parties?"

/Answer/ The Ummah Party is the largest of the old parties in size. Of the large parties, it is the only one that grew up in the modern sector. It is unique among these parties in knowing the art of modern politics; the other big parties are still ruminating over the style of the fifties. Then too, the Ummah Party is the one organization that can enter into dialogue with all the other political parties without any sensitiveness, as we are acceptable to right, left, and middle, to army and civilians, and to the south.

We in the Ummah Party believe that the capitalist road to development is of no use to our country. We call for development led by the public sector, for just distribution of the national wealth, and for subjection of the private sector to regulations to prevent its engaging in exploitation. In foreign policy, we call for the Sudan to free itself from dependency on any international camp, and for the independence of the national economy from any foreign grip. We naturally reject the Camp David Agreements. As far as we are able, we shall work to change the Sudan's official stand on them, for the Sudan has no interest in supporting the Camp David Agreements, nor does Egypt itself have any interest in their survival.

'No' to al-Turabi's Front

/Question/ What is your response to Hasan al-Turabi's call for the creation of a front of Islamic parties?

/Answer/ We believe that it is not possible to disregard the May experiment as if it had never happened. On the Islamic level, the so-called Islamic experiment was an improvised experiment without any value. Its intention was political exploitation and opposition to the consensus of the Islamic movement in the Sudan. It is a discarded experiment, one that harmed and distorted Islam and played games with Islamic law. Its real place is the dustbin of history. It was an unjust experiment; it cut off the hands of 200 hungry people, while it announced to the rich that they would be free if they returned the millions they had stolen. In the very shadow of his Islamic experiment, Numayri sold out on the Sudan's Islamic and nationalistic commitment: He supported Israel in evacuating the Falashas; he sold the Sudan's honor by agreeing to the burial of American atomic wastes in the soil of the homeland; and he described his political enemies as infidels and apostates, according to his personal whim. The Muslim Brotherhood remained silent. How then can one ally oneself with them after all these differences? That was not all; they swore allegiance to Numayri as a religious imam! So before the Muslim Brotherhood thinks of an alliance, let them answer the question of how they allowed themselves to swear allegiance to an ignorant, unjust, and utterly unqualified man as religious leader.

Those who swore allegiance to Numayri have made light of religion and country. Anyone who was a partner in his crimes ought to be brought to account according to the law of deterrent popular retribution; anyone who merely swore allegiance ought first to repent of his sin. It is unwarranted to speak about "allegiance sworn to Numayri on conditions that he did not keep." That would be ignorance of the system of swearing allegiance in Islam. Numayri's lack of competence as an object of allegiance was clear before they swore; their swearing despite their knowledge of his incompetence was a crime.

We in the Ummah Party are advocates of unity of the serious and conscious Islamic movement. We believe that those who cannot prove their consciousness and seriousness cannot talk about the unity of the Islamic movement, and that they are incapable of speaking frankly about Numayri's experiment, an experiment that we consider to be his insult to Islam. It is difficult for us to come to an understanding with anyone who does not consider it in this way.

#### Circumstances of the Reconciliation

/Question/ What were the circumstances of the Ummah Party's alliance with Numayri and the circumstances of the rupture of this alliance?

/Answer/ We did not ally ourselves with Numayri. We opposed his system from its first day. We prepared a memorandum of democratic demands, which the martyred Imam al-Mahdi presented to Numayri during his first days. Then there were a succession of movements and uprisings, in the course of which a large number of people were killed as martyrs or imprisoned. Through its sacrifices and boycotting of the regime and its agencies, the Ansar lost the greatest part of its advantages and property. After the 1976 uprising, which tried to overthrow Numayri by force, the regime became afraid and rushed to seek national reconciliation. He offered us reconciliation; we accepted on the basis that we would work to do away with the regime by means of the ballot box and by attempting to form student and professional or worker union organizations distant from the domination of the gangs of the Socialist Union. We presented him with a 9-point program. He made evasive moves about accepting or rejecting it; so we decided that reconciliation had come to a dead end, and we concentrated on building up our own presence within the Sudan.

However, national reconciliation gave the opportunity for the growth within the Sudan of independent trade union organizations capable of moving against the will of the regime. It also made possible relations between us and men in the armed forces.

/Question/ What is your evaluation of the events of 26 March?

/Answer/ It was a popular uprising in the full sense of the word, the culmination of the Sudanese political movement's position and of its continued opposition to the regime. A quick look at the scenario of events seems necessary. Omdurman Islamic University began the first move of the revolution; its student union kindled the first spark. This union played an important part in breaking the monopolization of the student movement and releasing it from the grip of the Muslim Brotherhood, who were supporters of the May regime, and who had dominated most of the student unions during the last year and a half, paralyzing their activity and thereby frustrating the historical role of the Sudanese student movement, which was always the living conscience of the Sudanese people. The Muslim Brotherhood did this in return for narrow partisan gains; what they obtained

in return from Numayri was hardly worth mentioning. The Omdurman Islamic University union was the first union to break the Muslim Brotherhood's exclusive hold on the student unions. The ansar students formed an alliance with the independent students, which led to the overthrow of the Brotherhood. Their downfall followed in the rest of the other unions; and for the first time, by virtue of the alliance of independent and democratic elements with the Ansar, the student movement was removed from the grip of the Muslim Brotherhood, and consequently from the paralyzing grip in favor of the regime. The demonstration at Omdurman Islamic University was the laboratory that prepared the Sudanese street to ring out in harmony with the call of all factions of the opposition, until there took place with great efficiency the general civil disobedience of the Wednesday preceding the movement of the army. In our consultations with the other professional and party forces, we suggested the proclamation of a covenant of national salvation, and the other parties accepted.

I contacted some of the high-ranking officers of the army shortly before Wednesday and said to them, "You are sons of this people and its protectors. Your only alternatives are to attack the demonstration or to remove Numayri." They said to me, "We will not oppose the demonstration; however, whether we move positively depends on the comparison we make between Wednesday's people's parade and the parade to be organized on Tuesday by Numayri's deputy, 'Umar al-Tayyib, in support of the regime. Tuesday's parade turned out to be a sparsely attended farce; Wednesday's was large and overwhelming. I think that the army leaders decided after comparing the two parades that the people had decisively rejected the regime. Thus we played a part in bringing about the history-making accord between the people and the army. The other political forces played other roles, so that finally the people's revolution became a reality. The Muslim Brotherhood had not the least relation to the uprising; they probably wished that it not occur at all.

It is not true that Numayri was afraid of the Muslim Brotherhood. Really, he took them lightly and thought that he had bought them off at a paltry price. He knew that they were afraid of him and that they had many interests for which they were afraid.

#### Guarantees to Secure the Revolution

Question What guarantees do you think are necessary in order to realize the goals of the revolution?

Answer The basic guarantee is a commitment to the National Salvation Covenant; the second is that the people exercise their political rights, with the granting of freedom of expression and organization, freedom of opinion and publication; also, the continuation of the sweeping popular wave, since the agitation of the Sudanese streets is a constant guarantee against arbitrary and tyrannical rule. Also among these guarantees is the military oath, to which loyalty to the transition period covenant has been added.

/Question/ Do you not think that the matter of reviving the National Democratic Front is one of these guarantees?

/Answer/ The National Democratic Front, in its old structure, is a matter of the past. There is, however, no doubt of the need to pursue a nationalistic line that will include all Sudanese political forces without exception, as long as the groups accept the general foundations of this nationalistic line.

#### Pitfalls of the Iranians

/Question/ What is your opinion of the Iranian revolution?

/Answer/ Unlike many Arab forces, we have had relations with the Iranians both before and after the Iranian revolution. It overthrew an arbitrary and tyrannical regime. It presented Islam from the standpoint of independence from foreign domination and of justice toward the oppressed. We see these as great and shining ideas.

However, the revolution fell into the pitfall of taking its point of departure from a Shi'ite ideology. We believe that the revolution must begin from the Koran and the Sunna, not from a particular sect, which would deprive it of its revolutionariness. In Iran, the religious establishment monopolizes all the measures taken on various problems; the Iranian outside of this establishment has no way to take a leadership role. Then again, the revolution covered over sensitive national areas, rather than treating them. The revolution was unable to produce contemporary models for the Islamic political and economic experiment; it gave the initiative and lead to the repositories of tradition--the Ayatollahs--alone, even though they are not conversant with the problems, features, and culture of this age. All these things were pitfalls that brought it about that our expectations for this revolution were not realized.

#### Prospects for South

Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 8 May 85 p 10

/Article by Amina al-Naqqash: "The South: The Most Complicated of the North's Problems"/

/Text/ The recent Libyan announcement of a halt in military aid to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of the Sudan and to its army that has been waging an armed war in the South since 1983 under the leadership of John Garang presents a new opportunity to discuss the problem of the South, a problem that is one of the most complicated on the list of the Sudan's afflictions after its deliverance from the affliction represented by Numayri, since it is connected with the problem of stability, security, and unity.

This step may play a part in bringing closer together the divergent points of view of the ruling military council in the Sudan and of the Popular Movement led by Garang, a former officer in the Sudanese army. The movement began with a military mutiny against Numayri's attempt to wrest from the South the gains that it had won in the self-rule law and against his appointment of three commissioners for the three southern regions. It was able to obtain support from a number of officers and soldiers of the Sudanese army itself, as well as support from the tribes of the South. It mobilized elements from them into its army, together with elements from the older local movements. In addition, it obtained political and moral support from Ethiopia and Libya, particularly when it undertook to contest the activity of the multinational corporations that Numayri had granted oil prospecting concessions in the South. It destroyed their rigs and prevented them from operating. Because of the movement's reliance on jungle warfare, two previous military campaigns have failed to abort it.

It did not, however, turn into a traditional secessionist movement, nor did it rely in its opposition to Numayri's rule on a call for the secession of the South. Its covenant called specifically for the institution of a socialist transformation in the Sudan, north and south, the building of a unified socialist Sudan, consideration of the South as an inseparable part of the country, and the combatting of secessionist tendencies by offering a democratic solution to the problems of ethnicities and religion within the same framework.

In the wake of the April uprising, John Garang, who enjoys wide popularity within the political forces in the North, announced his refusal to deal with the new government, considering it an extension of Numayri's regime. He appealed to the Sudanese political parties to cooperate with him in realizing what he called "the final elimination of the May regime."

It appears that the new military leadership's hesitation in expressing its willingness to discuss the demands of the Popular Front--the legitimate representative of the southerners--has veiled its leaders' fears, in spite of the fact that the political forces in the North all recognize the legitimacy of the front's leadership and representation of the South.

The front's demands take as point of departure the objective reality of the South: a population of 4 million, encompassing a large number of religions, some monotheistic, such as Christianity, but most of them pagan and tribal religions, not to mention the region's large number of languages and cultures, its overall backwardness in comparison to the Islam-dominated North, and its low level of culture and civilization. All of this creates sensitive problems requiring a treatment that will satisfy the legitimate demands of the southerners, who control a large portion of the Sudan, including as yet unexploited natural riches.

The dispute about how to exploit these riches and how to distribute the revenue from their exploitation represents one of the difficult problems now faced by the Sudan. The most prominent demands of the southerners may be summed up as follows:

1. Repeal of the Islamic Shari'a laws, which they see as having harmed both Muslims and non-Muslims; separation of religion from the state; and the allowing of freedom of religion, provided that this freedom not be misused for political purposes.

The difficulty in this demand lies in the fact that the revolutionary leadership's announcement of readiness to review certain provisions of these laws has met with resistance from most organizations of the Islamic political current. The latter have warned against complete repeal and have announced that criticism of the law's application does not mean that secularism is the alternative.

It does not appear that the southerners will under any circumstances welcome being subject to a religious central government in the North. Such a government would not normally be in their interest as long as there exist among them pagans and adherents of tribal religions whom Islamic law decrees ought to be fought, while it gives believers in the monotheistic religions a choice between Islam, the sword, or payment of a special poll tax. This creates the problem of reconciling an insistence on preserving Islamic laws and the demand for keeping the South within the framework of a united Sudan.

2. The southerners also demand revived implementation of the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement during the transitional period. The latter was the agreement which put an end to a 17-year civil war between North and South, and which stipulated regional autonomy for the southerners within the framework of a single region. Numayri torpedoed the agreement in June 1983, when he redivided the South into three regions.

In the light of their experience of how this agreement was implemented and the northern rulers' inclination to overturn it, southerners may be expected to demand a broadening of the scope of the rights granted to them under it. Doubtlessly, this will create certain difficulties arising from the discovery of mineral wealth in the South, wealth which will make its people desirous of wider freedom to use this wealth than was set forth in the agreement.

Although the military council in the first days issued a decree to reimplement the Addis Ababa agreement, it went back and issued other decrees which the southerners considered to have violated the first decree, since in accordance with the latter a military administration of three generals was appointed for the three southern regions (Upper Nile, Bahr al-Ghazal, and Equatoria). In the opinion of the southerners, this action violates the letter and spirit of the agreement.

3. The southerners also demand a review of the public corporations and foundations that draw up economic policies and set local development plans, so that the southerners shall have a voice heard in them, a voice that would lead to the development of their various regions and would lessen the cultural gap between North and South.

The southerners believe that there have been attempts by the North, begun by Numayri, to redraw the boundaries so that the North would include the areas rich in mineral wealth such as oil, uranium, zinc, and nickel.

4. The southerners call for a freeze on work on the Jonglei Canal and cancellation of the integration and joint defense agreements with Egypt. The southerners believe that these were signed at the expense of their rights to the wealth of their country, especially their right to the waters of the Nile.

5. The southerners believe that an attempt was made, after the seizure of power by the armed forces, to exclude them from consultation regarding the choice of a new prime minister, and to assign them certain ministries, as if these were their due, in spite of the fact that these ministries had no connection with the centers of political decisionmaking--not to mention the fact that those who were chosen for them were southerners from the North.

In spite of these and many other difficulties, the Libyan decision and the attempt of all the Sudanese forces to unite and work in a common front to rebuild are factors that will doubtlessly cast their shadow on the position of the southerners. It is this that may perhaps resolve much of the complexity of the southern problem and consequently solve the greatest of the Sudan's problems.

#### Egyptian-Sudanese Relations

Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 8 May 85 p 10

/Article by Amina al-Naqqash: "The Future of Egyptian-Sudanese Relations" /

/Text/ The principles that President Mubarak announced in his recent speech about Egyptian-Sudanese relations do not appear to be a response that is in agreement with what the Sudanese are seeking as new foundations for the relations between the two countries, since he limited himself to generalities about the everlasting nature of the relationship of the Sudan and Egypt, the right of the Sudanese to choose their own way, Egypt's wish for their independence, and non-intervention in their affairs.

What the Sudanese seek is more detailed and definite, and more complicated to put into practice.

In spite of the many friendly declarations exchanged by Egyptian and Sudanese officials, observers of political forces in the Sudan, and even diplomatic circles, including Egyptian, perceive that a new era in relations

between the two countries will have to begin, and that the Sudanese hope that Egypt will be able to correct the error it committed when it put all its eggs in Numayri's basket. During the uprising and the first days following it, some Egyptian declarations caused a negative reaction in Khartoum. Among these was a threat to intervene, a threat that was not accompanied by a reservation of utmost importance: that such intervention would take place on the basis of a request from the Sudanese. Then too, the suggestion by the Egyptian authorities that they had cognizance of what was going on in the Sudan was not reassuring to the Sudanese.

Although it seems that Egypt has been able to neutralize the consequences of these negative actions, there still remain a number of basic points on the agenda of the new formula for Egyptian-Sudanese relations. They are:

1. The consensus of Sudanese political forces of every denomination in rejecting the Camp David Accord, based on the fact that Numayri's joining the camp of those who accepted the agreement harmed the Sudan's relations with the Arab states and placed it, along with Egypt, in isolation from them, in spite of the fact that the agreement contained nothing in the interest of the nation. Cairo should not expect support, popular or official, from the Sudan for such agreements.
2. The Sudan's relations with its neighbors ought to be determined in the first instance by Sudanese interests, not by Egypt's problems with those neighbors. It is the consensus of these political forces that Egypt has exploited the Sudan to oppose Libya and Ethiopia, and that the Sudan has no interest in such a policy. Rather, the opposite is true: the fact that the Sudan's abilities to defend its borders--seven African or Arab states border it--are less than Egypt's abilities makes it in the overall national interest of the Sudan to improve its relations with its neighbors. It was no accident that the first high-level visit to Khartoum was that of 'Abd-al-Salam Jalud at the head of a large Libyan delegation.
- Within this framework, these political forces demand the cancellation of the Egyptian-Sudanese mutual defense treaty, which grants Egypt the right to intervene in Sudanese affairs even if the Sudan does not request it.
3. The consensus of Sudanese political forces, including the Muslim Brotherhood, on the necessity for a reexamination of the issue of integration between the two countries and their agreement that integration as it presently exists was nothing but a security gift to protect a popularly rejected regime, as well as a military axis aimed at certain countries, and a political axis to gain passage for certain policies that contradict the Arab position on the Palestinian question. These forces also agree that Numayri worked for integration from a position of weakness, seeking any support for his regime, and that the Sudan therefore came out in an inferior position in the matter. These political forces accordingly demand that the integration issue be reexamined and carried out on foundations that take into account the interests of the two peoples, Sudanese and Egyptian, and their free democratic choice. They demand that it not take place in the absence of mass, popular, and party organizations, but rather with their full participation.

4. The problem between the North and South of the Sudan has an aspect related to Egypt. The southerners object to the Nile water distribution agreement that gives Egypt a larger proportion of the water than the Sudan. They believe that development projects in the South require abundant water, making a review of the agreement mandatory. Beyond that, they oppose the Jonglei Canal project signed between Egypt and the Sudan and demand that work on it cease, based on their desire for a larger share of the water to be provided by the canal, not to mention their opposition to the plan to settle 2.5 million Egyptian peasants along the canal. It is worth mentioning that political forces in the North accept the southerners' demands in this area and consider them legitimate.

5. In spite of the fact that the remaining /in Cairo/ of Numayri--"the Sudan's Shah and Sadat," as he is called by al-Sadiq al-Mahdi--appears to be a marginal issue, it does enter into the fabric of these issues and takes on an importance greater than the issue's value in itself, since the Sudanese people's bitterness over what Numayri did to them is obviously mingled with their bitterness over the Egyptian regime's support and defense of Numayri. It seems that the very least that Egypt's closest friends in the Sudan expect from Cairo is that Numayri leave it for any other capital.

The preceding points are offered to decisionmaking circles in Egypt, whose duty, as the Sudanese say, is to become aware of the fact that the Sudan after the popular uprising is by no means as it used to be previously.

12937  
CSO: 4504/366

ISRAEL

BRIEFS

MOLOTOV COCKTAIL INCIDENTS--A youth from the Al-Am'ari refugee camp in Ramallah, (Iyad Ahmad Fulayfal), was today given a 10-year prison term for having thrown Molotov cocktails at Israeli vehicles. Our correspondent Arye Gus reports that the Ramallah military court found him guilty of heading a group of six youths from the refugee camp who threw Molotov cocktails at Israeli cars at least five times. The other members of the group were given prison terms of between 3 and 4 years. [Text] [Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1600 GMT 27 Jun 85 TA]

TECHNOLOGY SPHERE COOPERATION--Israel and Japan are to examine possible cooperation in high technology, research and development. This was stated by Communications Minister Amnon Rubinstein who returned yesterday afternoon from Japan. Rubinstein met with his Japanese counterpart and with industrialists dealing with communications and electronics. [Text] [Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 0400 GMT 22 Jun 85 TA]

TRADE WITH SPAIN (MC)--Israeli exports to Spain increased by 10 percent in 1984 and totalled \$29.5 million, as compared to \$26.9 million in 1983. Included among these exports are agricultural products, agricultural inputs and chemicals. Israeli imports from Spain increased by 13 percent, to \$86 million. Chief among these were motor vehicles, metals machinery and iron. These figures are from a survey prepared by the Ministry of Industry and Trade for a seminar to be held on possibilities of developing trade with Spain, with the participation of exporters and economists. [Excerpts] [Jerusalem GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICE in English 19 Jun 85 TA]

IDF REDEPLOYMENT COSTS REPORTED--The IDF Logistics Branch spent a total of 17 billion shekels on the withdrawal from Lebanon which was completed last week. The cost of the IDF redeployment to the purple line [international border] implemented by the IDF logistics branch stands at about 100 billion shekels, of which about two-thirds were spent on a basic immediate "investment," and another third on permanent infrastructure for the future. In a conversation with BAMAHANE, Colonel A. [not further identified] said that most of the expenses stemmed from the second stage, evacuating the eastern sector and the Tyre area, and the rest on evacuating Sidon, the final pullout from Lebanon, and improving equipment and buildings and setting them up on the purple line. In addition, 1.5 billion shekels were invested in the absorption of the Ansar detainees and another 250 million shekels were spent on humanitarian aid to the Christian refugees from southern Lebanon. [Report by Barukh Ron] [Text] [Tel Aviv BAMAHANE in Hebrew 19 Jun 85 TA]

SENIOR IDF APPOINTMENT--Aluf-Mishne Aharon Ofir is to be appointed adjutant-general of the Israel Defence Forces today and promoted to the rank of tat-aluf (brigadier-general). He replaces T-A Beni Deqel, who is to receive another senior IDF post. [Text] [Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 14 Jun 85 p 3 TA]

CULTURAL AGREEMENT WITH ITALY--Israel and Italy today signed an agreement on a 3-year plan for the exchange of cultural, art, scientific, and technological information. The agreement was signed by David Rivlin, the director of the Foreign Ministry's Cultural and Scientific Affairs Division, and [Alessandor Romano], the head of the Italian Foreign Ministry's cultural relations branch. [Summary] [Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1330 GMT 13 Jun 85 TA]

6,000 MOVE TO TERRITORIES--During 1984 6,000 Jews moved to Judaea and Samaria, whereas only 1,600 people moved to the entire northern district. Three hundred and fifty moved to the Golan Heights. This is reported by the Central Bureau of Statistics. [Summary] [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 14 Jun 85 p 1 TA]

ISRAELI-FRENCH TOURIST COOPERATION--Israeli and France are to step up tourist cooperation. At the end of the French tourism minister's visit to Israel it was announced the two countries would hold tourism weeks in November, boost investments, and promote combined packages from the Far East to Israel and France on the lines of the present successful arrangement with the United States. Israel and France will also promote popular and canvalescent tourism. [Excerpt] [Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 1700 GMT 10 Jun 85 TA]

CSO: 4400/176

KUWAIT

KUWAITI FUND LOANS SIGNED WITH VARIOUS COUNTRIES

GF281200 Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English 27 Jun 85 p 13

/Text/ The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development yesterday signed loan agreements worth over KD Kuwaiti dinars/ 9 million in aid for projects in Malta, Mozambique, Burundi and Guinea Bissau.

The fund granted KD 3.3 million to Malta to finance a power project.

The KD 6.97 million project, for which 47 percent of the cost will be covered by the loan, is to meet Malta's increasing demand for electricity.

The agreement was signed on behalf of Malta's Emalata Corporation and for the fund by the Chairman and Minister of Finance and Economy Jassim Muhammad al-Khurafi. A guarantee agreement was also signed in respect to the loan by Al-Khurafi and Malta's principal assistant secretary at the Ministry of Finance and Customs, Edgar Wadge.

The fund also signed an agreement with Mozambique under which KD 2.9 million will be made available to finance the Mozambique railways projects.

KD 2.99 million project is to improve the railway systems by providing technical assistance, spare parts, tools and machinery for the repair and maintenance of mainline diesel electric locomotives and equipment for computerized wagon control.

The Mozambique minister of ports, railways and merchant marine, Alcantara Santos, signed on behalf of his country while Al-Khurafi signed for Kuwait.

Burundi also benefitted from a loan agreement under which 48 percent of a road project will be financed by the fund. It granted KD 2 million to the country.

The project is to improve about 42.5 km of roads between the cities of Nyanza-Lac and Makamba in southern Burundi. Burundi's minister of planning, Mathias Sinavenye, signed on behalf of his country while Al-Khurafi signed for the fund.

The fund also granted a loan of \$4.471 million to Guinea Bissau to finance the reclamation of the Mangrove lands for a rice project.

The \$6.749 million project, of which 66 percent is to be covered by the loan, aims to increase rice production.

Guinea Bissau's secretary general at the Ministry of Finance, Dr Eduardo Dument signed on his country's behalf, while Al-Khurafi signed for the fund.

CSO: 4400/184

KUWAIT

KUWAITI CONSIDERING PLAN TO HELP BANKS SOLVE CRISIS

GF301436 Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English 29 Jun 85 pp 1, 11

/Text/ Kuwait is considering a \$1 billion aid plan to help local banks and financial houses over a debt crisis stemming from the 1982 local stock market crash, banking sources said.

A priority will be to help settle some foreign debt owed by troubled financial institutions, the sources said.

Finance and Economy Minister Jasim Muhammad al-Khurafi has agreed in principle to the idea, according to letters written by Central Bank Governor 'Abd al-Wahab al-Tammar and published this week by the Arab daily AL-GABAS. Al-Tammar thanked the minister for his approval in principle.

The crisis followed the stock market crash, which left KD /kuwaiti dinar/ 27.3 billion (\$90 billion) in worthless postdated checks. The state, in an effort to solve the problem, has watered down most of the liabilities and urged settlements below original face value.

But a fall in share and real estate prices has cut the value of many debtors' assets and loan collateral, exposing the banks to large bad, or doubtful debts.

In the letters written to Al-Khurafi, Al-Tammar said banks and those investment firms and money exchange houses which were structurally sound, but faced liquidity problems, would receive aid under the plan.

LA-GABAS said the plan envisaged a credit package of KD 500 million (\$1.65 billion) in state funds.

The banking sources said the amount eventually could be higher.

The money would be used in part to create liquidity in the financial sector and give banks leeway to reschedule clients' loans which could be saved.

Bankers say a cure to the crisis is vital to recovery of the economy, which has slumped from double-digit growth in the 1970's to recession now, caused largely by the stock crash but aggravated by falling oil income and the Gulf war.

Al-Tammar specified in one of two letters that KD 100 million (\$330 million) should be set aside to cover needs of money exchange houses.

It was not immediately clear whether this was part of the KD 500 million package, or extra funding, the sources said. Al-Khurafi said last month the Central Bank had already arranged a \$51 million emergency credit to help Kuwait's second biggest foreign exchange, Jawad and Haydari 'Abd al-Hasan Company, meet liabilities incurred on foreign exchange dealings.

It provided half itself and arranged for local banks to muster the rest.

The sources said they expected the government to retain a safety net for this type of liability to help maintain the reputation abroad of Kuwaiti financial institutions.

The government also wanted to avoid giving foreign banks reason to cut credit lines to Kuwaiti financial institutions, which would harm both their financial standing and the national economy, the sources said.

"However, it (the government) has drawn a clear distinction between such foreign exchange debt and the liability on any loan or credit extended by foreign banks," one source said.

"It has been made clear that in any loan or credit, the foreign bank should have evaluated the risk and must bear the consequences," he added.

The sources said details of terms and conditions under which credit should be given were being discussed by the Central Bank and the commercial banks.

Al-Tammar wrote to Al-Khurafi that it was possible that cash used in the proposed rescue plan would not be recovered, but said:

"Support for the banking and financial sector is an economic priority. We should sacrifice some public money, as the net result will be a boom for the national economy."

Meanwhile, referred dealers have submitted a memorandum to the National Assembly speaker, suggesting ways to end the crisis, according to a Kuwait Establishment for Selling Shares' source.

The memorandum centered on bank loans, and applied only to dealers owing up to KD 500,000 to the banks. It called for waiving all interest on these loans from 1 September 1983 until now and said that the government or a private organization should pay the debts on behalf of the dealers immediately.

The memorandum said that the debtors should be given 10 years to pay their new creditors with one percent interest if current conditions continued. The dealers' properties would be the security against the loans.

The dealers who made the proposal said their solution would help small dealers who spent all their savings at the stock market, and the banks would not be harmed much if they sacrificed a little profit to help solve the loans crisis.

Low prices offered at a public auction of referred dealers' shops stopped the Establishment from selling those. An auction will be held later.

CSO: 4400/184

KUWAIT

KUWAITI OFFICIAL CLARIFIES PASSPORT POLICY

GF301440 Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English 29 Jun 85 p 1

/Article by As'ad Samman/

/Text/ People whose documents contained a "minor mistake" are not sent back to their countries, and Kuwait airport security staff consider each case separately, an official has said.

Denying rumors that people would be turned away for minor reasons, the head of the passport section at Kuwait International Airport, Capt 'Ali al-Shallal, told AL-SIYASAH newspaper that if the mistakes were not grave people were allowed into the country.

He advised that people coming for the first time to Kuwait on a visit or work permit should go through their documents "carefully" to ensure there were no mistakes.

Only if the matter was grave, such as a mistake in the name, would anybody be sent back, he said.

Al-Shallal categorically denied rumors that the residence of people of certain nationalities, Arab and foreign, were being cancelled at the airport.

He said this was "absolutely untrue," and explained that what happened was that the section began stiffening measures against residence violators of all nationalities. Violators were handed over to immigration staff.

The main problem facing the passport section was that some people came to Kuwait without a visit or work permit, and they, naturally, were sent back.

Another problem was that the address of sponsors was often not known, and income passengers were kept at the airport for 3 days to enable them to contact their sponsors. After 3 days, people failing to contact their sponsors were sent back. This happened mostly in the case of servants, he said.

The third problem was similarly in the name of some passengers with those who have been banned from leaving the country. Such passengers could not travel until the matter was sorted out.

Al-Shallal said that his section was doing its best not to delay travellers at the airport, and his staff were not given leave during the "spring and summer."

He urged passengers to come at least 2 hours before their flight to avoid delay, and said they should ensure that their passports were complete and the children included in the residence of either parent.

In some cases, children who were not included in the residence permit were not allowed into Kuwait.

CSO: 4400/184

KUWAIT

BRIEFS

EXPATRIATE RESIDENCY POLICY CHANGE DENIED--The Kuwaiti Ministry of Interior has denied reports that Kuwait decided to cancel the residence permits of expatriates staying outside Kuwait for more than 3 months. Maj Gen Yusuf al-Khurafi, Kuwaiti interior ministry undersecretary, has stressed that the law on residence in Kuwait has not been changed. The law says an expatriate must not stay outside Kuwait for more than 6 months unless permission is obtained from the ministry within this period. In a statement published today by AL-WATAN, Al-Khurafi said that expatriates in Kuwait must always inform the passport and nationality directorate of their journeys abroad and changes of address.  
/Text/ /Doha QNA in Arabic 1120 GMT 24 Jun 85/

CSO: 4400/184

OMAN

BRIEFS

COMMUNICATIONS PACT WITH FRANCE (MC)--Muscat, May 26 (WAKH)--Omani Minister of Information 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Rawwas today signed an agreement with a French consultant firm. Under the agreement the French firm will draw up a plan on ways of extending Oman's radio and television transmissions to new areas in the sultanate. The plan will also include location for FM radio and television transmitter needed to extend the coverage. [Text] [Manama WAKH in English 1600 GMT 26 May 85 GF]

VARIOUS OFFICIALS TRANSFERRED (MC)--Sultan Qabus ibn Sa'id today issued three decrees transferring 'Abdallah ibn Sa'id ibn 'Abdallah from the Ministry of State for Foreign Affairs and appointing him as under secretary for the Ministry of Post, Telegraph, and Telephone for 6 months from 1 July; transferring Sulayman ibn Hamad ibn Sulayman al-Harisi from the Ministry of Housing to the Ministry of Royal Diwan Affairs; and transferring 'Abdallah ibn Darwish ibn 'Abdallah al-Qasimi from the Ministry of Royal Diwan Affairs to the Ministry of Housing and appointing him as deputy under secretary. [Summary] [Muscat Domestic Service in Arabic 1300 GMT 26 Jun 85 GF]

CSO: 4400/175

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

'ARAFAT'S TRIP TO CHINA VIEWED

Riyadh AL-YAMAMAH in Arabic 29 May 85 p 27

[Article by Mahmud Ma'ruf: "PLO: Peking Has Given 'Arafat What Moscow Has Refused To Give"]

[Text] Yasir 'Arafat keeps traveling from capital to capital, to a third capitals. This eternal nomad is not worn out by the seats of airplanes nor has their roar become unfamiliar to him as he tries to keep the case of his people outside of closed drawers and affirm its existence in a period of various forms of plotting against this existence. The wings of the plane that carried him to Peking were unusual not only because they headed for the capital of a country with a population of a billion persons but because they carried him for the first time as head of a joint delegation of Palestinian and Jordanian officials.

'Arafat has not heard anything new from China, which was virtually the first non-Arab state to recognize the PLO on the occasion of its birth and the first capital to give its head at that time a head-of-state welcome and offer him the first arms deal--medium-sized tanks.

Sino-Palestinian relations have not weakened since that time even though the Chinese realized that the Palestinians were trying to shift from their country toward Moscow, and through Moscow toward Washington. They did not oppose this because they realized the power and influence that Moscow and Washington have over the course of the struggle in the world, the Palestinian issue in particular. However, this relationship has experienced some coolness at times and whenever slackness became characteristic of Sino-Palestinian relations it regained its warmth. However, the importance of the visit to Peking arises from the fact that it is the first international recognition and support of the Palestinian-Jordanian agreement signed last February. The delegation headed by Yasir 'Arafat was the joint delegation that Moscow refused to receive and Washington would not talk to. Moscow has been wary of the Amman agreement from the beginning, openly exhibiting fears of its consequences and unofficially declaring that it will help promote dissension and division in the Palestinian arena. It refused to receive the joint delegation, which consisted of the chief of the PLO political department, Faruq Qaddumi, and Jordanian Foreign Minister Tahir al-Masri but requested the presence of each separately if they wished.

Al-Masri did not accept the invitation but Qaddumi did and met with a number of Soviet officials, who told him they rejected any joint Palestinian-Jordanian action, warning that Yasir 'Arafat is moving quickly toward Washington, something that does not please them, that they have no alternative to dealing pragmatically with the Palestinian question in view of the existence of two sides and that their relations with the Palestine Salvation Front will become official if "Arafat continues to follow the same policies. Washington still refuses to talk with the joint delegation on the grounds that it refuses to recognize the PLO until it acknowledges explicitly U N Security Council resolution 242 and modifies its national charter which calls for the destruction of the Zionist entity. If it sees in the Palestinian-Jordanian agreement some positive elements, it does not see in it sufficient clarity.

U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz during his last visit to the region did not show any signs of retreating from the administration's position, even though all the Palestinians whom he met in the occupied territory categorically refused to participate in any efforts apart from the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. When he met with King Husayn, he was told virtually the same position, although the king offered some suggestions to help the journey to peace. After Richard Murphy's trip, which preceded Shultz's visit to the region, the Jordanians and Palestinians were able to reach an understanding about the make-up of the joint delegation to take part in the talks with Washington. The latter did not object in principle to talks with the delegation except that it insisted on the Palestinians being outside of the PLO institutions. This is what the PLO rejects and regards as a blow to its gains and to the uniqueness and legitimacy of its representation of the Palestinian people.

The Jordanian ruler told Shultz that independent Palestinians might participate, but they are members of the Palestine National Council in the joint delegation and that these individuals were chosen by the PLO leadership. Shultz rejected this but not too forcefully, indicating that the matter involves more than the question of representation because Washington realizes that there is no alternative to the organization in the settlement efforts. Thus, it does not consider the question of names and individuals controversial. As Mr Yasir 'Arafat said, what is important is to affirm the principle of the thing. The main issue is the answer to the question: Why talk with Washington? Amman and the PLO want these talks, first, to be assured of American recognition of the PLO and, second, to have Washington act as a mediator in the negotiations with Israel, although the organization has announced from time to time that it wants these talks in order to make it possible to hold an international conference on the Palestinian issue.

George Shultz told the Jordanian ruler that Washington is still not convinced it has a role as partner in any peace negotiation but it is prepared to do whatever it can to bring about direct negotiations between Jordan and Israel, even if there are Palestinians in the Jordanian delegation, provided they are not prominent members of the PLO and do not declare that they represent it in the negotiations. Shultz also went to Aqaba, from

which he returned somewhat optimistic and sending his deputy for the Middle East, Richard Murphy, in a new round of visits between Cairo, Rabat, and Rome to present ideas, listen to questions, and ask for help in overcoming the obstacles. Afterward King Husayn, too, traveled to several Gulf capitals and then to Cairo. He will proceed to Rome, London, and Washington with the intention of exploring ways to take advantage of the latest opportunity for peace within the framework of the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement in particular, although both superpowers are dissatisfied with various elements of the agreement and this initiative. Mr Yasir 'Arafat pays the price from his power and influence day after day and tries on every occasion to assert his presence in various ways, especially since the Palestinian division is still strong. Damascus, the powerful pivot in the settlement, is still fighting him, and Palestinian blood is flowing copiously in the Beirut camps, to put an end to any political role for the Palestinians and to control these camps without letting him play any part in halting the flow of blood. "Arafat's appeals are not listened to and his cries have no effect because his power is dissipated and his forces are distributed in more than one capital and the capitals do not listen. However, he does not despair of the initiative. Perhaps he will achieve something, and though it is unlike Washington or Moscow, Peking is one of the five great powers that will attend the international conference if it is ever held. However, 'Arafat's main concern still is to find a foothold near his country so that the issue can remain a constant preoccupation of the world, although 1985 is different from earlier years. Circumstances have changed and the balance of power has assumed a different form.

5214  
CSO: 4404/370

SYRIA

ECONOMIST ANALYZES AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCING PROBLEMS

Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 6 Mar 85 p 4

[Article by 'Ali Ma'ruf: "Financing Development in the Light of Surplus Production, Existing Agricultural Relationships and Future Horizons"]

[Text] "Financing agricultural development" was the second from the last subject before the fourth Tuesday Economic Seminar on agriculture and agricultural development in Arab Syria.

In it Dr Sa'id Nabulusi dealt with a number of matters that together constitute the basis of this subject. Basically, this included a general elucidation of the agricultural problem presented in the lecture. This was accomplished by the lecturer's moving from the particular to the general by way of detailed figures to progress gradually from "the agricultural surplus" to "accumulation in the agricultural sector" and "financing -- self-financing, governmental financing, and bank financing."

The Agricultural Surplus

At the outset the lecturer referred to the special importance of the agricultural surplus in economic thinking, since it constitutes the material basis of the development of societies, the social division of labor, and the historic appearance of money and trade. Its realization is important not only for supplying the necessary work force for other economic sectors, but also because as an agricultural product it constitutes the material basis for expanding the basis of the social division of labor and economic development as well in the developing countries. Such countries are characterized in general by the small size of the agricultural surplus, which is due to the backwardness of the producing forces and to the ways in which the sur-lus product is owned. This is a problem that is not confined to the smallness of this size, the slow rate of its growth in these countries, and its unproductive use in parasitical consumption fields. Rather, it is due more importantly to the conditions surrounding the production of the surplus -- conditions that do not permit its size to exceed a certain limit because the prevailing level at which the surplus is formed does not basically permit a change in the relationship between the time necessary to produce the requisite product to renew the labor force and meet immediate needs, and the time necessary to develop and increase the size of the surplus agricultural product.

## Accumulation in the Agricultural Sector

From some economists' point of departure in classifying the developing countries on the basis of the economic formations prevailing in those countries and the economic and demographic status of the agricultural sector in them, the lecturer believes that this sector, which continues to constitute the point of departure for development and accumulation activity, naturally incorporates opportunities that are tangible and that are afforded by the surplus that it produces. He believes also that any attempt to examine the subject of financing agricultural development activity must focus primarily on this frame of reference, and the program followed in this study does not proceed from the assumption that accumulation is solely a financial problem. For accumulation, like any economic phenomenon, cannot be studied apart from the production relationships prevailing in the society during a given stage of history. To point this up, the lecturer went back to the period before the changes that began in the 1960's. He referred specifically to the year 1958, when 8,000 big landowners controlled 70 percent of the land, including water sources, so that it could be said that there was a twofold monopoly: one of land and one of water. Against this, 66 percent of the fellahin in the rural areas did not possess any form of land ownership except for a minority who owned small plots the combined yield of which, despite the effort exerted by all the members of the family, was not sufficient to provide the requirements necessary for survival. In the conditions of the political system prevailing at that time, agricultural relationships were most frequently based on sharecropping, whereby the proprietor supplied only the land, along with part of the means of production, in return for the lion's share of the crop in addition to this share of the price of the water.

This kind of agricultural relationship provides an opportunity to achieve a kind of accumulation through the existence of an agricultural surplus since it clears the way for a gradual shift away from the sharecropping system to the system of renting land and exploiting it by capitalist methods. It is similar to what happened historically in the development of agriculture in certain European countries such as England since the beginning of the second half of the 18th century. However, the lecturer said, there is a difference from what happened in England and it is due to two basic factors that have hindered the development of capital for agriculture in the developing countries:

The first factor, in essence, is the ownership of the lion's share of the surplus agricultural product by the landowners, which amounts to ownership of all the surplus product. The second factor is the one that is manifested in the imperialist policy toward the developing countries that aims at preserving the status quo and hindering any development of capital in these countries. In them the agricultural sector continues to be a traditional and a stagnant one the mission of which is to satisfy the increasing parasitical requirements of the landowners. The lecturer added that one must refer to the laws on agricultural reform and agricultural relations respectively in the matter of the possibilities for agricultural financing and accumulation -- possibilities that result from the application of these laws. These possibilities necessarily require that there be made available conditions for the growth of the agricultural product and an achievement of an increased surplus agricultural product, the effects of which extend to include other economic sectors as well, especially the industrial one. One must also consider the failure to achieve the aims of these two

laws, particularly those relating to the obligation of the fellahin to form cooperative societies, along with the existence of a disparity in the ownership of agricultural land, which in general is divided into three degrees of possession. Of these, 74.6 percent own 10 hectares, 24.7 percent own from 10 to 100 hectares, and 7 percent own 100 or more hectares. This distribution shows that small and medium-size proprietorship represents the most widespread type with respect to the agricultural product. This ownership is associated with a number of matters that are considered to be investment problems. The most important of these are:

1. The scattered nature of (mutalazimah) proprietorship, along with the dispersed character of the means of production and the labor force.
2. The impossibility of using modern technology.
3. Shrinkage of the possibilities for accumulation as a natural result of the decline in the level of the productivity of labor, along with the shortage of self-financing and the search for various sources of financing like (seed) capital and bank loans.
4. Failure of production capacity to keep pace with the growth of the population and the latter's increased consumption needs.
5. Weakening of the country's ability to export and its being driven at times to import foodstuffs at the expense of products necessary for development.
6. The subjection of a major proportion of products to the workings of the marketplace and distribution channels, particularly in the absence of planning in the field of cost and pricing.

Over against these problems are the positive results of distributing proprietorship. They are represented on the one hand by the partial or total abolition of the concentration of the surplus product and land, as a source of this product, in the hands of a few proprietors and on the other by a reduction in the growing demand for land and an increase in the income of the fellahin class.

#### Self-Financing

The lecturer continued by elucidating the matter of self-financing as follows:

The participation of the private sector still averages 70 percent of investment in agriculture and in some years it reaches 75 percent. Investment by the cooperative sector varies from 24 to 29 percent, while investment by the governmental sector has declined to the point where at times it reaches 1 percent of the crop area. In the case of the three principal crops -- wheat, cotton and sugar beets -- the participation of the private sector may come to 3.2 [percent] of the total product, the cooperative to between 2.1 and 3.1 at times, while participation by the governmental sector varies from 1 to 12 percent of the total production of these crops. With reference to the share of the agricultural product in the gross domestic product for the years 1963 - 1970 - 1973 - 1983, we find that this share represents 25 - 16 - 13 - 12 percent, indicating a decline in the agricultural sector's share of the gross product. This is so despite the

fact that in 1983 the rural labor force constituted 52 percent of the country's labor force. It is noted also from the statistical data that the value of the net agricultural product has fluctuated owing to weather factors that put it next to the commercial sector in net yield. It is followed by the role of the building and construction sector and then by the industrial sector, so that the average income of a person working in the agricultural sector was 54 percent less than the average income of those working in the other sectors in 1979 and 64 percent in 1983, when it amounted to LS8,739 per year. This does not permit the attainment of any savings to speak of that could be used to provide the necessary possibilities for financing agricultural development.

In addition to the above, the pricing and marketing policy constitutes another negative factor because it does not attempt to calculate cost on accurate bases. The greater part of the products remains subject to the workings of the marketplace, particularly in the case of small producers. Also, there is the rise in the prices of materials required for production, such as fertilizers, seed, machinery, fuel, etc. In general, the percentage of the value of the materials required for production that are used in agriculture constitutes a tiny percentage of the value of such materials that are used in the country. This percentage is disproportionate to the position of the agricultural sector in the national economy and it is not consistent with the requirements for agricultural development, which should occupy the first place in the size of national investment since we know that the rise in the cost of needed materials from time to time does not mean that we are getting more of them, because it is a cost resulting from the rise in the price of them. This is another factor that complicates the problem of investment, especially since it is not accompanied by an increase in the price of the product -- an increase that is based on an accurate examination of the cost. One gathers from this that self-financing in agriculture is insignificant compared with the other economic sectors as well as in comparison with the country's total investments. This is due to causes the most important of which are:

- A. A decline in productivity.
- B. The middleman's domination of pricing and marketing and the absence of any effective channels with regard to them.
- C. The steady rise in the price of materials needed for production, most of which are dependent on imports from abroad.

#### Governmental and Bank Financing

The lecturer said that the governmental public sector participates in the financing of eight agricultural establishments in the country's governorates and six economic organizations belonging to the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform. They are the General Poultry Organization, the General Cattle Organization, the General Fish Organization, the General Seed Increase Organization, the General Agricultural Mechanization Organization, and the General Fodder Organization.

The areas of the state's fields varies from 45 to 68,000 hectares suitable for agriculture. During the period 1979-1983 governmental investment focused

basically on projects for reclaiming land for agricultural purposes, increasing the sown area, reforesting rainfed land, producing fruit-tree seedlings, and completing stations for servicing mechanical equipment and poultry and cattle stations. Government expenditure on agricultural investment projects during the aforementioned period was LS5.1 billion, constituting 10.1 percent of the total government expenditure on development projects in the country. This was despite the fact that the most recent 5-year plan gave priority to the agricultural sector and rural development in general. The greater part of these investments was devoted to irrigation and agricultural reclamation projects, so that the share of these projects came to two-thirds of the government's total investment in the agricultural sector for that period. At the same time, the remaining third was concentrated on the rest of the agricultural activities, such as animal production, agriculture and forest services, and the raising of fish. Thus governmental investment in horizontal expansion accounted for 78 percent of total investment and the other part, or 22 percent, was allocated for investment in vertical expansion projects.

Another thing that we note is the decline in the ratio of agricultural loans, which during 1979 amounted to only LS710 million, while in the same year commercial sector loans came to LS6,235,000,000 or a ratio of about 9 to 1. This ratio increased in the period 1979-1983 to the point where commercial loans were 12.8 times greater than agricultural loans. On the subject of the financing of agricultural development the lecturer proposed:

1. The taking of measures to deepen the process of agricultural reform and to move on to a higher stage of cooperative production characterized by centralization of the means of production and the division and organization of the social labor force in the agricultural sector.
2. A shift to cooperative methods of production and the complete liquidation of the remnants of feudal relationships in the rural areas so as to form the substantive basis for increasing the productivity of labor and increasing sources of financing to meet the country's growing requirements for agricultural products and to achieve some degree of independence in the world market.
3. A reexamination of the method by which the prices of agricultural products are set.
4. A shift over to types of production cooperation to pave the way for employing modern technology and training common-labor cadres and skilled-labor cadres.
5. The use of customs policy to protect national plant and animal products from competition on the part of imported goods if national products do not meet the country's needs.
6. An increase in bank capital for the agricultural sector and an increase in the volume of loans to the cooperative sector and the small producers. It should be seen to that they are properly used and are economically effective. Action should be taken also to expand bank-monitoring operations so as to embrace all forms of agricultural investment.

SYRIA

#### 1985 PLAN FOR ROAD BUILDING IN HAMAH GOVERNORATE

Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 6 Mar 85 p 3

[Article by Mahmud al-Hammud: "Building and Paving of 110 Km of New Roads in Rural Areas This Year"]

[Text] During the past 3 years the governorate of Hamah has experienced a great development of rural and urban roads. The city proper has been linked with the district and subdistrict centers by good roads that have been repaved to facilitate the transportation of citizens from the rural areas to the city.

In addition, hundreds of kilometers of roads have been built to connect rural areas with the highways and the desert with the city. The length of the roads constructed during the past year is 100 km at a total cost of 40 million Syrian pounds.

#### Plan for 1985

This year work is going ahead on the construction of 110 km of rural roads and LS 45 million has been allocated in the investment budget and the independent budget for the construction of these roads.

Engineer Muhammad 'Ajjaj, head of the highways division in the Directorate of Technical Services in Hamah, states that work on the construction of the rural roads is progressing in a highly satisfactory manner. Concerning the plan for 1985, he said that this year the 38-km long Hamah-al-Hamra' road project would be completed at a cost of LS6 million for widening and dressing it. The following road projects are to be completed also:

The Kafr Zayta-al-Suqaylibiyah road, 3 km to be paved and 14 km tarred at a cost of LS 4 million.

Repair and paving of the (Bqasqas)-Sifata road with a length of 23 km at a cost of LS5 million.

Paving, tarring, and construction work on the Kafr Buhum-Abu road with a length of 23 km at a cost of LS5 million.

The Tall Qartal-Abu Dardah road, 7 km long, at a cost of LS 700,000.

Spraying tar and sand on the Wasr Abu Samra-Duma road for a distance of 12 km at a cost of LS1 million.

Covering (baqaya al-maqal) and spraying tar on the Tall 'Abd-al-'Aziz-Saburah road for a distance of 10 km at a cost of LS1 million.

The al-Shihah-Masyaf road. Paving and repairing 6.5 km and spraying tar for a distance of 9.5 km, at a cost of LS800,000.

Completing the paving and tarring of the 'Ayn al Kurum- al-Salahimah road at a cost of LS1 million for a distance of 7 km.

Paving and tarring the Qumhanah-al-'Aqidiyah road for a distance of 4 km at a cost of LS1 million.

Tarring the al-Jajiyah-al-Jinan road, a distance of 6 km at a cost of LS1 million.

Completing the foundation course for the al-Ghuwayrah-Tall Agharr road, a distance of 12 km at a cost of LS2.5 million.

In addition, the Ma'an-al-Tulaysiyah road, 16 km long, will be completed at a cost of LS4 million. Also to be completed are the Tumin-Harb Nafsah road, a distance of 9 km, at a cost of LS2 million; the al-Turaymah-Kafr Hud road, a distance of 3 km, at a cost of LS900,000; and the Salmiyah-Marj Matar road, a distance of 12 km, at a cost of LS2 million.

Work will begin immediately on the Tayyibat al-Imam-Halfaya road project, a distance of 12 km at a cost of LS7 million, including the bridge to be constructed over the Orontes River. This road connects the Hamah-Aleppo highway with the al-Ghab and Muhradah region. Work will be undertaken also on the al-Karkat-Shahranar-Shir Maghar road and the road leading from Masyaf to the east of the town.

Replacement and renovation projects.

In this year's plan for projects for replacing and renovating roads LS10 million has been earmarked for the following road projects:

Masyaf-'Ayn Halaqim, a distance of 8 km.

Masyaf-'Ayn Halaqim [as published]

B'amrah-al-Dulaybah

Al-'Asharinah--Jubb Ramlah turnoff

Al-Shaykh 'Ali Kasun--al-Salmiyah

The length of each road is 8 km. There are projects that have not been started that will be included in next year's plan. They are:

The Hamah-Khattab road, 8 km long.

Repairing and widening the (Hillin)-al-Laqbah road, 9 km long.

The Mu'ardis--Tayyibat al-Imam-Qumhanah-highway road.

The Kafr Zayta-al-Lataminah road, 6 km long.

The Salmiyah-Tall 'Ada road, 8 km long.

Repairing and dressing the Harb Nafsa subdistrict road, 6 km long.

The (Qurmus)-public-highway road, 4 km long.

Repairing and dressing the al-Ta'unah-Kafr Kamrah road, 7 km long.

Repairing and dressing the al-Mazari'-(Tall al Hawwash) road, 8 km long.

#### Projects Under Way

There are some road projects that have been under way since 1984. They are:

The al-Tayyibah-(Alfan) road, 4.5 km.

The Qurtuman-Dayr Huwayth road, 5 km long.

The Tall Sikkin-Qabr al-Shahid road, 4 km long.

The al-Tulayshiyah-al-'Aliyah-al-Mushayrifah road, 5 km long.

Roads in al-Ghab district, 4 km long.

#### Roads in Masyaf District

Dressing the Dannin road, 3 km long.

In addition, some road projects under way have been completed. They are:

The al-Sindyanah-public highway project, the Kafr Laha-Wadi al-'Uyun road, the 'Ashiq 'Umar-'Ayn Shams'al'Birah road, the Dayr Shumayyil''al'Tafranah road, the Al Muzayri'ah road, the Barshin road, the Hikr-Bayt 'Anq road, the Mashta al-Laqbah road. In addition, there is the construction of a reinforced concrete bridge in al-Hurayf and two crossings in the village of 'Anab.

The cost of these projects is about LS8 million.

#### New Projects

This year a start will be made in implementing new rural road projects. The length of the roads in the new projects is about 45 km and the cost is some LS5 million. Most of these roads are for linking up villages that lie near to one another. These roads are: the Kafr Laha-Talaf road; the al-Mufakkar al-Sharqi road; the Masyaf-Qayrun road; the Kaft Laha-Talaf road; the Tayyibat al-Imam-railroad station road; the Buraydij-al-Suqaylibiyah road; the Janjur-public highway road; the guidance unit-Jita road; and the Qiratah, al-Hajjamah, Ma'an, Bsayrin school, Khirbat 'Anqa, al-Biyah school, and the secondary-school roads.

12541  
CSO: 4404/345

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

BRIEFS

FORGED DOLLAR NOTES--Abu Dhabi, 23 Jun (WAKH)--Forged 20-dollar notes has been discovered in the emirate of Ra's al-Khaymah. A 100-dollar bill presented last week by an Asian newcomer to the British bank office in Ra's al-Khaymah was found out to be counterfeit following laboratory analysis. [Text] [Manama WAKH in English 1520 GMT 23 Jun 85 GF]

GNP DECREASE--Abu Dhabi, 31 May (WAKH)--UAE GNP has recorded a decrease for the third successive year due to the drop in the state's oil exports, according to an economic report by the UAE Ministry of Planning. According to the report, the average growth in the GNP was 23 percent during the period between 1975 and 1980, against 6.8, 10, and 2 percent in 1982, 1983, and 1984, respectively. Regarding foreign trade, the report indicates that the value of exports and imports dropped from 104.8 billion dirhams in 1982 to 87.8 billion in 1983, a decrease of 6 percent. Forecasts indicate that the volume of foreign trade during 1982 dropped by 2 percent when compared to 1983 figures. [Summary] [Manama WAKH in Arabic 0950 GMT 31 May 85 GF]

ISRAEL BOYCOTT (MC)--Dubayy, 31 May (QNA)--The Israel Boycott Office in Dubai emirate in the UAE issued a number of decisions boycotting or lifting the boycott on a number of foreign companies that produce commercial films. This is in implementation of the resolutions of the Arab boycott of Israel. Eighteen films produced by the U.S. companies Paramount, RCA, and BCS have been placed on the boycott list. The boycott was removed on 23 films by the British Rank Organization, which is a branch of the U.S. Xerox Company. [Summary] [Doha QNA in Arabic 0810 GMT 31 May 85 GF]

ARAB BOYCOTT, BAN LIFTED (MC)--Abu Dhabi, 21 Jun (QNA)--The Israel Boycott Office has lifted the ban on the U.S. Company Xerox, one of the most well known international companies which manufacture office equipment and modern photocopying machines. It also lifted the ban on the company (Yuku Jawa), based in Japan and the Netherlands, with branches in the FRG, Italy, and Belgium. The office boycotted a number of Zionist organizations, including the Israeli immigration agency in Canada and all its branches, the Zionist-Canadian organization, and the Israeli-Austrian society. The boycott decision also affected the U.S. Johnson Company for control euipment and 33 of its branches in a number of countries, the U.S. Lincoln Company and its branches in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, and the (Nata) Company for control equipment and 36 of its branches all over the world. [Summary] [Doha QNA in Arabic 0830 GMT 21 Jun 85 GF]

AID TO BANGLADESH (MC)--Abu Dhabi, 21 Jun (QNA)--The UAE newspaper AL-ITTIHAD reported today that UAE President Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan al-Nuhayyan has issued instructions to give \$1 million to Bangladesh. This amount is the UAE's contribution to the victims of the cyclone and the floods which swept Bangladesh last month and to mitigate the suffering of the stricken families.  
[Text] [Doha QNA in Arabic 0820 GMT 21 Jun 85 GF]

CSO: 4400/175

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

BRIEFS

DEPUTY INTERIOR MINISTER APPOINTED--Prime Minister Haydar Abu Bakr al-'Attas issued a decree appointing Muhammad Nasir Jabir as deputy minister of the interior. [Summary] [Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1230 GMT 13 Jun 85 GF]

AMBASSADOR TO POLAND--Brother 'Abd al-Wakil al-Sururi yesterday presented his credentials to Comrade Wojciech Jaruzelski, chairman of the Council of State in the Polish People's Republic, as PDRY nonresident ambassador to Poland. [Excerpt] [Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1230 GMT 23 Jun 85 GF]

COOPERATION AGREEMENT WITH POLAND--A program for cultural and scientific cooperation between the PDRY and Poland was signed yesterday in Warsaw. Signing on behalf of the PDRY was Brother 'Abd al-Wakil al-Sururi, PDRY nonresident ambassador to Poland; and on behalf of the Polish side by Comrade (Maivezko), deputy foreign minister. [Excerpt] [Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1630 GMT 27 Jun 85]

CSO: 4400/180

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23 July 1985

AGRICULTURE IN COASTAL AREA DESCRIBED

Sanaa AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 15, 24 Apr 85

[Article by 'Abdallah al-Shahari]

[15 Apr 85 p 3]

[Text] There is nothing worse for a person's health than to stay in one place for a long time. I endorse the view of the ancients, the wise poets who said: Travel around, for the joys of one's desire are in traveling; drink from every pure spring, do not stay at a waterhole. And those who said: Travel, for the joy of life is in traveling, etc. There are many sayings, including: Travel, for there are five advantages to traveling. So my longings called me out to face the hazards of a difficult trip, though I did not expect to face fearful hardships during it. But the unexpected happened, for the rains poured down heavily, which caused swollen streams to surge through the valleys and prevent cars from passing, including my balky car. I left Sanaa for Hajjah and then Bani Qays (al-Tur) taking the Khashm road, that road that is and will be a thorn in the side of the people of Hajjah until God knows when, despite the fact that if the money were spent to repair this road it would be more economical and fairer to everyone whose car is ruined after one or two trips along that road which forces the person in the car to dance violently as he travels along it, even if he does not like to dance. I and others were confronted in Wadi Khayafah by a rushing torrent. After hardship and waiting for the force of the stream to subside, we crossed it. We had scarcely come free of danger when we were confronted by another valley west of Suq al-Aman with an angry torrent; after trouble and waiting we crossed it, and were surprised by the fact that Wadi Shahr and Wadi Ibn 'Ali were more dangerous, to say nothing of the road having been torn up because of the heavy torrents of rain. We had not crossed Wadi La'ah on the south west side of the district of al-Tur--Bani Qays when we looked upon our exhausting load of work; I forgot that I had intended to visit the director of the county of Bani Qays, Shaykh al-Hadi 'Uthman Muhjib, because of the bond of friendship that binds me to him. But I did not agonize over having forgotten because choking had prevented rhyming, as the ancients would say. Journalistic work is very difficult mentally and physically even though it is not a type of hard labor. We had gotten tired of submitting newspaper articles from within the capital, so we in the newspaper decided to diversify the sources of the articles from various governorates of the republic, which is experiencing great progress and radical changes in various fields.

Ya'qub

Shaykh Ya'qub, the shaykh of al-Khashm, is revolutionary, an unknown man of average means. Before the revolution, I used to distribute pamphlets against the rule of the imamate, and I used to flee to al-Khashm and hide with this good shaykh, who used to hide me without knowing of the seriousness of what I did or the seriousness of what the imam would do to him if he found out about my hiding there. Shaykh Ya'qub and the kind members of his family used to overwhelm me with their totally unaffected hospitality since they considered me to be one of them. Since the revolution until this day I had not visited them, though within me I felt guilty on account of them since I had not visited them to find out how they were doing. However, this time I absolved myself of guilt and visited them. They received me with open and kind hearts that I cannot describe, even though their chief, the shaykh, is just a farmer like any member of his tribe or one of the most humble among them. He swapped jokes with them and discussed various matters with them. As I had noticed before the revolution the mutual help and understanding between him and his companions, I notice the same thing now. His friends would take some of his qat placed before him, and he would also take some of their qat and drink with them from the same container, a small jug. A person is al-Khashm is impressed to see that the home of Ya'qub's family is located at the foot of the mountain by the fertile valley of al-Khashm where the greenery of the crops never ends throughout the year since it is located at the end of the mountain chain. I joined them in the late afternoon last Friday in an exceedingly friendly and gracious gathering. Every one of them asked me how I had been and about my circumstances during the time that I had been away from them. It was as if I were one of them, and nothing separated me from them except that I did not cover my head with a "kufiyah" of woven reeds or a fringed head-dress. I was extremely delighted to be with them, and they were even more delighted. I relaxed with them until sunset, then I said goodbye to them while they all scolded me for my brief visit, and they would not let me leave them until I had made urgent pleas and excuses, with the hope that I would return and enjoy a visit with them some evening remembering the past.

Stop at Dayr Qa'mus

My car had almost run out of gas when I stopped before Dayr Qa'mus, which consists of huts in the form of domes covered with straw or grasses to mitigate the heat of the sun in the summer while people take their afternoon naps inside. No one disputes the fact that the grasses that cover these domed huts do not store the heat of the sun as is the case with cement block and stone, since the heat leaves it with just a breath of air. I began to look around, left and right. I saw that some of the farms were green and some were dry, so I asked a man standing nearby: Why are those farms green? He said: Those farms belong to well-to-do people who were able to rent drills and buy water pumps, so they irrigated their farms, which became filled with crops, bananas, and various fruits and vegetables. But other people of limited income were unable to get drills and buy pumps. As Brother Shu'i Hasan--that was his name--was explaining the situation to me, I felt deep sorrow on account of the barrenness of those vast agricultural areas that needed nothing more than irrigation. He added that if only those who supply the drills and pumps would

help us by allowing us to pay in installments; we could pay for them and turn this land for whose barrenness we grieve into a green oasis with far flung borders.

#### My Opinion of the Drill and Pump Suppliers

It is obvious that the suppliers of drills and pumps are interested in getting paid for their goods. So what if they dug wells and offered pumps to the farmers of Tihamah and to others with guarantees that they would pay the cost in installments? That would not hurt them, especially since the land is fertile and rich, and the people are trustworthy by nature, no doubt about it. In this manner, these suppliers would have had a part in the promotion of agricultural activity and they would not have lost anything. On the contrary, they would have profited and become closer to the good citizens, for Tihamah has started to grow bananas and various fruits and vegetables in addition to types of grain, and that throughout the year as long as water for irrigation is available. Based on what I know, the ancients in Tihamah used to believe that their area could only grow grain and nothing else, but now thanks to the underground water obtained by pumps, it has started to grow various vegetables and fruits, in addition to varieties of grain, that bear fruit during a period of 2 months or continuously, and because of the variety of crops, they bear fruit during all seasons without a break. It is good land, the people are good. How good it would be if the suppliers of this equipment would become better and closer to the producer and make things easier for him.

#### Yemeni Farmer is Unique

As soon as the rainy season approaches, he begins to plow the land and prepare it, confident that God will not frustrate his efforts and diligent work, for he is absolutely sure that his efforts will not go to waste at all and that his blessings are not in question. How wonderful is this confidence and natural certainty in God! I said to uncle Haddash, "How can you plow and prepare the fields when the ground has not been watered by the rains?" He replied as he gazed at the plow hitched to two thin oxen, "God Almighty said, 'Do you sow it or are We the sowers?'" I rejoiced at this certainty that our city lacks but with which our humble peasantry is blessed. I asked Uncle Haddash, whose body was both bronzed and thin, "Do you have any other profession?" He replied, "Indeed not. I have no profession other than plowing and planting and reading the Qur'an." He rose in my esteem, because his faith arose naturally from his piety and was not put on. Abundant perspiration was pouring from him, but the sweetness and gentleness of his faith in his heart cast a spell on him that turned the midday heat into coolness and serenity. I asked him, "Can't you buy a tractor, Uncle Haddash?" He replied, "I could if I sold a piece of my land, but I would rather die than sell a single foot. My arable land is a part of me completely, so how could I sell a part of me?" I said, "but you will get tired." He replied, "Toil of this sort is a pleasure and a joy." He said, "One could pay attention to such an idea if talk could buy it." I was afraid that he would heap reproach on me, so in order to back out of my intrusive position, I asked him if he had any water that I could drink. He said yes, so I drank and took my leave of him, thanking him for the friendly conversation, even though his tongue had been sharp at the end.

## 'Abs Region and the Rural Water Project

A year ago or so in 'Abs, whose main subdistrict is in need of a water project since the first one does not deserve that name, I sat before the good farmer Ahmad Harib Qatbi on a chair with wooden legs and straw cords, while he reclined in his seat. When I brought up the subject of planting and harvesting, he excitedly began to explain to me the situation in his region of 'Abs Ibn Thawwab, saying, "First of all, the electricity: that vital utility is as one would wish. However, the water project is extremely bad and of little benefit. Then, the rural water project has been implemented as one would wish, but a number of wells have not had pumps installed . . so right now we are getting the good and the bad." Until now he had been speaking to me; then he fell silent lost in his turbulent thoughts. I seized upon his involvement to take a picture of him that he would not be aware of, but he did notice, so I assured him that the picture was for remembrance and nothing more. He believed me to a point, but his doubt in what I said showed in his expression. Brother ahmad Harib complained a lot about the increase in the prices of pumps and diesel, and he said, "If the suppliers of agricultural equipment would facilitate things for us as owners of agricultural property, things would be easier for us. But for us to pay the entire cost in cash after a 3 year drought, that is difficult for us. Thus their equipment will remain idle, and only a few will benefit from the business, and we will remain dependent on God's mercy during the rainy seasons. Under this system their business will collapse, as will our agricultural production throughout the year." He said that, and then I took my leave of him and his friends, even though I was enjoying my conversation with them, because my time was short and because of the oppressive heat that lasted as long as I was there. I went on to other regions in the coastal plain to gather information, especially about the Wadi Mur project which the Tihamah Development Agency has taken on, and which I will talk about at a later date.

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[Text] How beautiful is the coastal plain at the break of day, when the birds begin to exchange sweet words of congratulation with hearts filled with the purity of the dawn and of the pure sky. You see this, while he has driven his two gentle oxen before him, with a wooden plow of the Yemeni type drawn behind them. He held the reins without pulling hard to get the oxen to make the effort to pull it through hard, uncultivated ground. I had become friendly with that farmer, Hasan Ibn Hasan Khawamal, in Banu Hasan that lies between 'Abs and Hard. He had been a friend of my father, who is now retired from the judiciary in Hajjah, and who previously had been the Islamic judge in Hard. I had not expected that Hasan Ibn Hasan Khawamal would have property in this region, but because of his wealth, he had been able to possess property in a number of Tihamah's fertile regions, as Shaykh Hasan al-Madani had done. How delicious is the breakfast food in that beautiful country-side! Leavened sorghum bread is brought, along with natural curdled milk that the good women shake up in what is called a "dubbiyah" made out of a gourd, in order to separate the delicious butter from the curdled milk. It is supplemented with salted fish, "baghah," in addition to boiled okra or eggplant fried in the fragrant local butter. My memory of the food of one breakfast

with Hajj Rushdi Zubayr is of this sort, and considering the sort of appetite I was suffering from, it was more than enough to fill any hungry person from top to bottom.

#### Bani Hasan

I departed from Uncle Rushdi Zubayr, having descended upon his breakfast table like locusts on crops, or rather like a hungry official on the budget after his means have dried up. I crossed Bani Hasan, which lies half way between 'Abs and Hard, in order to see how beneficial the agricultural pumps had been in that wide plain with far flung borders. How extremely surprised was I when I saw that Bani Hasan, that fertile region whose protection by its shaykh before the revolution had been stronger than that of Kulayb Wa'il, was so barren it invoked sorrow. The reason for that was that the region seldom became green, because few of its people were able to buy agricultural water pumps or anything else. The complaint about the suppliers of agricultural equipment was the same as that voiced by the farmers in Bani al-Mashta, Qa'tabah and elsewhere, as Brother Ahmad Harib explained to me.

#### Matulah Market

I passed through the 'Abs market and went on to see the Matulah market, which does not differ from the 'Abs market in the abundance of vegetables, fruit and meat, which are so plentiful they fill the soul. The markets of these regions only had a few local sweets instead of fruits, just as meats took the place of nutritious vegetables. I walked around the market of 'Abs and then the Matulah market; that was before I crossed Bani Hasan. I saw green sorghum stalks and grazing livestock filled with them; I also noticed a well-being on the faces of the people. Breakfast foods used to be limited to curdled milk, salted fish, and local butter, but now meals are not served without being accompanied by various types of vegetables cooked in the tasty local butter. That is something which has made me happy because of the good nutrition in our rural areas, and that is in contrast to the malnutrition that the majority of the people used to suffer from in the past.

#### Athletics

I never passed through a town or village without seeing students walking around in it, in spite of the heat to which they were accustomed but from which I personally suffered. It cheered me greatly to no longer see emaciated bodies as in the past, for nutrition is good, thanks to the artesian farms and the abundance of vegetables. Bodies are strong, thanks to the athletic activities which are spreading to every town and village. That is something our beloved leadership sought after before we sought after it ourselves, striving to build a strong generation with perfect physical bodies and sound minds.

#### Health Care

Our brother doctor, the minister of health, is well known for his energy and vitality, and he only has to take one look at the clinics in the Yemeni

countryside to find out how beneficial their work has been, and to rectify deficiencies in them within the framework of the health budget only, and not go above what it can bear if that budget is tight to any extent worth mentioning. One look at the hospitals is enough to spark the workers to work better. One look at the private clinics is enough to stop the escalation in increases in the exorbitant fees for examinations and tests, that out of compassion for the poor person of limited income, since it is not reasonable for a poor person to ask his family to fast so that the cost of the food can be used to pay for an examination and medical tests at the private clinics. Some doctors make some of their fees for their imaginary toil so high that a poor destitute person cannot afford them, even though they make their living from such. The well-to-do, however, can go abroad for treatment, without submitting to the high prices' at home.

We have criticized those who fraudulently charge high prices in order to reap illegal profits by dodging reasonable price controls that allow for reasonable profits, and we have often hinted that examination fees at the private clinics are not reasonable. For example, a worker, the head of the family, works all day to earn 100 riyals in exchange for his toil to spend on his family. If, God forbid, God should decree that a member of his family be stricken with influenza, should he pay a doctor half his daily wages in exchange for the doctor putting his stethoscope on the patient's chest and telling him to use Paramol? This system is totally unjust; examination fees should be determined according to the individual's average income, and he who does not wish to be an angel of mercy should close his blood-sucking clinic, for the people have a ruler to protect them. This occurs in both the cities and in the countryside, but the situation is much worse in the city. The fees for a test for diabetes for an elderly patient is 1,000 riyals in Sanaa, and here is the patient and live eye witnesses should you demand proof of that! God Almighty. Then, after he has put a stop to the escalating pricing of examination fees in the private clinics, as if the doctors were selling luxuries, we should ask our brother the minister of health, to make a fact-finding tour to see the condition of the clinics that were set up but that are still empty, like Umm Fu'ad's heart, so he can find out the reasons for the neglect and work to rectify the problems in a number of Yemeni regions. He should make the trip to determine the facts for himself, because distortions occur in every service, as they say, and there would be nothing better than to investigate the facts in order to meet one's obligations and serve the people of the country.

#### Wadi Ibn 'Abdallah or Wadi Ibn Hard

Even though artesian wells are scarce around 'Abs, fresh fodder for livestock, vegetables, and some fruits that are suitable for hot regions are available in the markets. However, experiments are continuing with the planting of various fruit trees on the basis that if one bears fruit you will be blessed by it, but if the climate does not suit it, it will be a shade tree. On this basis, the planting of many types of fruit trees is going on, despite the loss of agricultural advisers in the agricultural regions. If the Tihamah Development Agency would devote itself to helping the farmers in Tihamah instead of to talk of dubious value, that would be better in terms of results

and more beneficial. A farmer who has a pump for irrigation finds himself all alone without agricultural direction. He is forced to experiment by himself using his agricultural experience. As I have noticed, he grows water-melon, bananas and pepper and various types of vegetables, and he hesitates to grow figs, apricots and grapes, fearing that he will not get yields comparable to the aforementioned crops in quality or productivity. The green farms extend here and there from al-Wa'izat to Wadi Hard, but they only cover a small portion of Tihamah, which needs parties to take the side of the farmer and work to develop his potential and agricultural experience from true aptitude and expertise, as they strive to develop agriculture with reasonable expenditures and guaranteed results.

#### Tour Through Wadi Hard

I took advantage of my boyhood companionship and friendship with Shaykh Haydar Muhib, who is remarkable for his great kindness and brotherly dealings with his tribe, in order to acquaint myself with the agricultural life in Wadi Hard and with what was new there. He took me around a number of farms that were irrigated by agricultural pumps. I was impressed by the various crops that I saw, including productive vegetable plants, various grains, and some of the types of fruit that are found in the markets in abundance. Some of them tend to spoil, in view of the fact that these farms are spread out even though there was no branch office for marketing agricultural produce to distribute the produce of producing regions to regions with little production, thus taking advantage of our diverse products.

#### Brief Meeting with the Deputy of Hajjah Governorate for Maydi district Affairs

I visited Hard at the beginning of August last year, when some vital projects were being neglected. Having arrived there, I had to find out what had been done from the deputy of the Hajjah governorate for Maydi district affairs. I visited him where he sits to receive people with business at the entrance to the building of the government center. I asked him about what had come to him about the state of the clinic, and he reassured me that it had begun operations a while ago and had started to receive patients, but that it was in need of some equipment and supplies, in addition to more workers, doctors, and technicians.

#### Electricity and Rural Water Supply

I asked him how successful these two projects had been. He explained that there were two generators, one of which was very old but the other was new and had been assembled about a year previously. It was one of three generators that had been made operational at the direction of our brother the president for each of Maydi, 'Abs, and Hard, and we have learned that agreement has been reached to buy three more generators. We are now busy contacting the concerned parties regarding keeping the current on in the three regions for 24 hours instead of 20 hours, which is how long it runs now according to the directives of our brother the president and leader. With respect to water, the city of Hard is still living with the old plan, which does not meet its goal. The administration of the rural waters project has

adopted a plan for the city of Hard. Two underground reservoirs of zinc were built, in addition to artesian wells and pumps, and that was done by a Japanese company. We are still hoping that the rural waters projects administration will implement this plan, and that it will erect a principle elevated water tank that will ensure that water will be supplied to the homes through a network of pipes, according to the directives coming from the highest authority on implementing it quickly. At the same time, the city of 'Abs is suffering from a weak water plan, and we hope that the party responsible for rural waters will take the initiative to solve the crisis that the region is living through.

#### Education

Regarding education, he said: Schools are spreading into all corners of the countryside, but expansion will continue as long as the population is increasing. There are no problems other than those the school directors inform us of concerning a shortage of school books and teachers, and there is no doubt that the city of Hard needs a girls school for the various educational stages.

#### Telephone Services

About telephone services, he responded to my question about how comprehensive they were by saying: In Hard itself, we still depend on the current sole apparatus that operates by solar energy. However, our brother the minister of communications, to whom we are grateful visited Hard in the past, and an understanding was reached with him on building a communications building and a telephone central that will meet the needs of the region. The building has in fact been built, and there is nothing left to do other than putting in the central and laying out the network, and that will be done soon.

#### Customs Income

I asked him how much that had gone up, and he answered: Customs duties in this field and elsewhere have been getting better, and if there are problems, there is no question that they will be overcome, God willing, if our brothers who are responsible in the concerned areas are sincere in their intentions.

#### Municipal Services

The city of Hard itself is still hoping that good will come from the municipal office of the governorate and the ministry of municipalities, because it needs a lot of necessary sanitation equipment, and it is the same in other regions of the district. He said this as he was looking at a number of papers in front of him, while a number of people with business were awaiting for the conversation to end so they could present their cases, so I only asked one more question:

#### The Hard-Maydi Road

I asked him about the plan to build the Hard-Maydi road and when it would be finished. He said: Our brother the president and leader is very

interested in cutting and paving this road, and he has announced on television and radio that this road and others would be completed soon, God willing. Here I took my leave on him, thanking him for his friendly conversation.

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YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

NEW PRESIDENT OF JOURNALISTS UNION INTERVIEWED

London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 1 May 85 p 8

[Interview with Ahmad Qasim Dahmash, head of the journalists union, by 'Abd-al-Wahab al-Mu'ayyid: "The Media Ate Me As Meat and Tossed Me Out As Bones, But There Is No Regret! The Guild Will Endeavor To Raise the Standards of the Press and of Journalists. The Arab Media's Problem Is That It Has Forgotten the Basic Objective and Has Turned to Side Issues"]

[Text] After the end of the fifth conference of Yemeni journalists, held from 16 to 23 March, there was an unusual surprise for political and cultural circles in Yemen at Professor Ahmad Qasim Dahmash's joining the conference, and then his being elected leader of the Yemeni journalists. He received a majority of the votes. The surprise was as great as the happiness of the Yemeni journalists with their new leader, who has extensive experience in the media field, has a strong personality and can bring the guild from stagnation and negativism to dynamic life capable of solving their problems and raising the standards of the press and the journalists.

Perhaps the underlying reason for surprise on the part of the former and the happiness on the part of the latter is that Ahmad Qasim Dahmash, age 55, has spent almost all his working life in the field of the media. His total in this field is about 30 years. He started out as an employee at Sanaa Broadcasting and wound up as minister of information until about 7 years ago when he announced his position loudly and clearly with regard to domestic practices in a letter containing his resignation from the job and his disapproval of the situation at that time. He left Sanaa for his village in the nearby countryside (Asnaf). He rejected all intercession for his return at that time. He continued to stay away from work until he was recently elected leader of the Yemeni journalists.

During and after the conference he talked directly with some of the newspapers, but we at the office of AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT preferred to give him an opportunity to become acquainted with the circumstances of the guild and to form a picture of the future on the basis of his work and his daily meetings with journalists and government officials in order for the interview with him to be comprehensive and clear. So the reader sees him as follows:

[Question] You disappeared from the scene of government work voluntarily about 10 years ago. What do you see as the most important motives for this withdrawal? And what have you been doing in the interim?

[Answer] When I found that my staying at the seat of responsibility at that time had started to be dishonorable, and I was on the verge of betrayal and self-deceit, I saw the conditions heading down a blind alley, so I chose to withdraw.

In my exile - a house without a farm - I did no work except self-examination and self-discovery. And I found that there was nothing to it. I was not suffering from any great shortcoming, so I set about expanding my knowledge. But it has been comforting to me that when I consider the past I have no regret about any action or position that I took. All the actions and positions were good. The affection of the people and their appreciation of me, especially those with whom I worked when I was minister, has confirmed this to me. This, in my view, is something one cannot put a price on.

#### Long Media Experience

[Question] You worked in the field of the official media for about 30 years, beginning in broadcasting and ending up in the ministry. How would you summarize this long experience?

[Answer] The experience that I received from the media, which ate me as meat and tossed me out as bones? Perhaps the officials of that era share with me today my concept and remember that their investigations and fears have brought them down from the heights, the pinnacles, to the functions of eavesdropping, censorship, and the subjection of statements and subject matter to suspicion and doubt, while accepting the remarks of the prim, the profiteers, and those short on brains and insight--and the direct contact with the implementing employees-remove this and put that-and perhaps abuse and imprisonment or dismissal-while the minister was awake, not sleeping. They disappeared, but the world went on quite well, and the experience, as I see it, is:

That excessive fear, circumventing rights, and not facing the issues and dealing with them in complete truth and faithful intentions are nothing but factors of the frustration and confusion of the government and the country, and the pressure by others on our weakness and the exploitation of that weakness. Operating with freedom and democracy and employing them in the framework of legislation and in the maximum interests of the people is the guaranty of continued stability and the continuance of building and progress.

[Question] Are you considering writing your memoirs? And if you do so, do you believe that this is the time for them to be published?

[Answer] I have not considered writing memoirs and I do not want to trouble my mind with what is not said.

[Question] During your long tenure as minister of information, how did you find the role of the Arab media toward Arab issues? And what should it be, in your opinion? Indicate its more negative aspects.

[Question] I suppose the role of the Arab media 10 years ago was somewhat better than today in regard to dealing with freedom and democracy, addressing the public, and presenting the issues that affect our lives and prosperity, as well

as in expounding the causes of the Arab nation and identifying and defining its enemies and exposing their plots. The Yemeni media today is far better than it was as regards content and freedom.

Great Confidence

[Question] In the fifth and most recent conference of the Yemeni journalists' guild you participated in a positive way. And in the guild members' election you received the most votes. If you please, what is the secret of your affiliation with the conference? And how do you explain this confidence that the conferees accorded you?

[Answer] My climb to leadership of the guild appears unusual to someone does not know what the situation was and what happened and to someone who knows and thinks he can explain it as he pleases. In reality I am not one who would accept being a tool in the hand of someone else and replacing Amin al-Manzalawi, as Dr Muhammad 'Abd-al-Malik said. The issue, with utmost clarity is this. I hurried to the conference on my own feet and of my own accord, as God is my witness. But after I was informed of the details of the conferees' dispute over the leadership of the conference, considering what happened concerning the sharp disagreement over the leadership of the conference, which lasted 2, 3, or 5 days at the most, we must imagine the conferees' difficulty at arriving at the presidency of the guild, which will last for 2 whole years. It was difficult for one of the various groups to accept the success of the other - no matter what came by way of election, free of any interference, because suspicion was able to control, shape, and guide. My acceptability by the majority of members of the factions, even if not by all of them, was a compromise, because it would get them around the dispute one more time and preclude all of them from their right to obtain leadership of the guild. This is my assessment. I would not have tackled what I did if it were not for my belief that the opportunity could be successfully seized. Most of the conference members had been watching for my arrival, and their acceptance and nomination of me strengthened my resolve to plunge into the fray. It is my hope, from God and my colleagues, the members of the administrative board, that we will be up to the standard of responsibility and that we will bring about something new and refreshing. It would please me to receive a response to this interview, if there is some deceit in it.

[Question] After your election to work exclusively for the journalists' guild, and from the short period that has elapsed, what is the most important journalistic issue that you feel takes priority in the concern of the guild? And how will you deal with it?

[Answer] There are many issues before the guild. But in the forefront will be foreign and domestic journalism training classes, holding symposiums and lectures given by prominent journalists from home and abroad, handling issues and problems pertaining to the national press and assisting newspaper owners with development in format, content, regularity of issuance and expansion of distribution, requesting our brothers in the Ministry of Information to review some of the articles of the law on journalism with a view to make it more flexible and compatible with the freedom and democracy prescribed in the National Charter, and calling for studies on erecting a commercial printing and publishing house,

supported by the state, in which the national press would supply 70 percent of the financing.

#### Guild Services

[Question] The journalists see you as a strong personality and accordingly they have put their confidence in you. They have pinned their hopes on you for raising the standards of guild work and solving the problems of the guild. How will you carry this burden, and what actions are possible and what are not possible at this time for realizing this objective?

[Question] We will try to take action to raise the level of the guild by striving to achieve the following if we can:

- 1 Find land for building a headquarters with ample facilities.
- 2 Reclaim the seat of assistant secretary general of the General Federation of Arab Journalists.
- 3 Tie together the members of the general assembly and the members of the administrative board and cooperate on keeping the contact alive.
- 4 Attempt to recognize who a journalist is and work on qualification and development of those who are lacking in these areas. Deal with their vocational and personal problems and raise their overall standards.
- 5 Study the possibilities of coming out with a newspaper for the guild.
- 6 Work with our brothers in the southern half of our homeland to incorporate the guild in the north with the organization in the south into a general union of Yemeni journalists.
- 7 Study the possibility of arranging with our brothers in the south to schedule a Yemeni journalist day.

[Question] Recently differences have widened in viewpoints between the Ministry of Information and Culture and some of the domestic press. Although this is regarded as a healthy sign, there are hidden causes behind these differences. What do you feel these causes are?

[Answer] There are no differences between our brothers of the national press and our brothers in the Ministry of Information and Culture except for what arises when the inspector puts his finger on a particular problem. The controversy is dropped when one of the two, the inspector or the editor-in-chief, backs off. This does not mean there is no frustration and hindrance, or at times, delay of the newspaper, and perhaps seizure of an edition. In fact these are problems and differences causing harm and burden to the two sides. The guild is first considering arranging meetings with newspaper owners and studying the press, censorship, and the law and coming out with a standard formula for us to submit to our brothers in the Ministry of Information for study and affirmation. If our brother journalists rise to the professional level and our

Information [Ministry] brothers rise to the responsible level, then there will be no lack of language and method to help them to an understanding of what they are after.

But when the newspaper owner insists on understanding that the government's fines and criticism is its whole work, and our brothers in the ministry insist that censorship means nothing but scissors and cutting, they will reach no solutions.

#### The Future of Domestic Journalism

[Question] Owners of domestic newspapers charge that the journalism law has not been for the benefit of the domestic press so much as against it, and that it has vague sections that can be interpreted several ways and used against the domestic press on any occasion. What is your view of the soundness of this? And will the guild sponsor an appeal to amend the law?

[Answer] At a previous point I indicated that after there have been meetings with the domestic newspaper owners and discussions of the press law, and after we have gone on record in regard to the sections that we consider in conflict with the legislation in the National Charter on matters of freedom and democracy and means of expression, our brothers in the Ministry of Information and Culture will be asked to review some sections of the law in order to make it more flexible so it will be compatible with the democracy which we enjoy.

[Question] What is the relationship of the guild of Yemeni journalists with the Arab Journalists Federation at this time? Will the seat as assistant secretary general of the union be restored? How?

[Answer] The relationship between the guild and the Arab journalists federation is good. This is confirmed by a telegram from the federation to the guild in which the federation expressed readiness to satisfy the requirements of the guild with regard to courses and lectures, and the guild will request that its seat as assistant secretary general of the federation be restored. We published the telegram in the newspaper AL-THAWRAH: perhaps you read it.

#### Printing Building

[Question] In dealing with the local press'printing problem, and the fact that Yemeni newspapers are seldom distributed outside Yemen, what do you suggest for handling these two problems? And what is the role of the guild in this?

[Answer] At a previous point I indicated in this regard that the guild will study carefully, together with our brothers the domestic newspaper owners and the Ministry of Information, the possibility of establishing a commercial printing and publishing house in the form of a national company or organization, in which the domestic press would contribute 70 percent of the capital with support from the state. This would provide for a system for publishing the newspapers, making available the foreign currency required for printing abroad. Also there must be a study of the condition of the newspapers regarding format, content, quantity, distribution, and the possibility of incorporating two or more in one.

AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFS

USSR HOUSING CONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE [MC][em]--The Soviet Union will provide equipment worth 1.6 billion afghanis needed by the Bibi Mahro Microrayon residential blocks project to the DRA. An agreement on supplying this equipment and sending 48 Soviet experts for this project was signed today in Kabul between the Kabul Housing Construction factory and the Tekhnoeksport organization of the Soviet Union. According to the agreement, the Soviet Union will assist the Afghan side with equipment worth 1.3 billion afghanis for 3 years on a long-term loan with easy conditions. The housing construction factory will use this equipment and material to build in 3 years more than 50 4-story and 5-story residential buildings, a polyclinic, school, and nursery, as well as shops and cultural and public buildings. [Excerpt] [Kabul Domestic Service in Dari 1600 GMT 22 Jun 85 LD]

SOVIET ELECTRICITY TO DRA [MC] [em]--The first phase in supplying 220-kV electricity from the Soviet border to Kabul was recently completed, and a 110-kv substation of the Mazar-e Sharif transmission line was inaugurated with a ceremony in Mazar-e Sharif city today. With the completion of the 220-kv transmission line from the Soviet border to Kabul, with a final capacity of 250 MW, the shortage of electricity in Kabul and the northern regions of the country, as well as in industrial institutions and localities lacking electricity, will be eliminated. Of the final capacity of 250 MW, 150 MW will be used in Kabul city and provide power for the Logar Aynak Copper Mine, the remaining 100 MW will be used in northern parts of the country. The transmission line will cost 2.78 billion Afghanis and will be financed through a credit from the friendly Soviet Union and the state development budget. The second phase of this project, which is the extension of transmission line from Kholm District [in Balkh province [em] FBIS] to the Aynak copper mine, will be completed in 5 years with the construction of Kholm substation and the transmission line. [Excerpts] [Kabul Domestic Service in Dari 1600 GMT 22 Jun 85 LD]

CSO: 4600/507

IRAN

CORRESPONDENT DESCRIBES VISIT TO JAMARAN

Paris LE MONDE in French 20 Apr 85 pp 1, 4

[Article by Jean Gueyras: "The Imam in His Bunker."]

[Text] While a new UN investigation last month confirmed the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq conflict, the Imam Khomeyni rejected a new idea for peace with the "Iraqi regime" Thursday, April 18 and denounced to foreign journalists "US partisans" inside and outside Iran who call for peace.

Tehran--A visitor to the Jamaran quarter, where the Imam Khomeyni's house is located, follows a well-established routine. Unless he is a high-ranking dignitary in the regime or a foreign diplomat, the guest must present himself at the bottom of the road which winds its way up the side of the hill toward Jamaran village at least 2 hours before his actual meeting with the imam. Security checks are long and meticulous.

After having completed a 2 kilometer trek on foot from Niavaran quarter to the imam's village tucked away in the mountain, the guest is invited to hand over all hard objects in his possession: watch, pencils, keys, etc., which will not be returned to him until after his visit. He is then frisked twice, "very thoroughly", by the pasdaran (revolutionary guards) responsible for the imam's protection. Next, he enters a corridor covered with a glass top and lined with metal shelves, where he leaves his shoes before penetrating the husseiniye where the imam usually addresses the faithful. Thursday, April 18 was an important occasion; according to the hegiran calendar, it commemorated the 27th rajab, the date on which the prophet Mohammed received the divine revalation of his mission on earth.

The husseiniye, which is located only a few meters from the imam's modest residence, is an austere, concrete building which serves as a religious, cultural and ideological meeting place. Including a first floor reserved exclusively for women and children, it is capable of holding nearly a thousand of the faithful seated on the floor. The imam addresses the crowd from a raised inside balcony which he uses as a podium. As usual, his appearance is greeted with drawn-out cries of "hail to Mohammed, his family and descendants", repeated 3 times by the audience.

The imam appears fit. Although his walk is slow, he moves forward confidently, without assistance from his aides. He will deliver his speech, nearly 40 minutes in length, seated in an armchair, almost immobile. To those who had not seen him for several years, he seemed thinner; his voice has lost some of its force. He is still the same, however, with his black turban, bushy eyebrows and his look, sad and severe even when making his audience laugh by stating "now the Americans want to give us lessons in Islamology".

It is a particularly receptive audience. Seated on the ground in good-natured disorder and confusion, it includes most of the government and Islamic tribunal leaders in the country, a few dozen mollahs in white turbans, maktabis with their families, most of the diplomats posted to Tehran and 15 or so foreign journalists currently in the capital.

The overall theme of the imam's speech Thursday centered around the futility "of advice offered us from America, France, Jordan, Egypt and even Iran, pushing us to make peace with the Iraq of Saddam Husayn , a dangerous animal who has nothing to do with Islam".

The atmosphere heats up quickly when the super-charged audience boos the United States, the USSR, Israel and the "hypocrites" cited by the master of ceremonies, and especially when Colonel Shrabi, commander of land forces, asks the imam to bless the army flag while the military orchestra and a chorus of soldiers break into a revolutionary song glorifying the imam.

#### Demands of the Hezbollahis

The feast of the Prophet, which coincided with Army Day, saw something of a truce in the campaign the Hezbollahis (partisans of God) have been leading for more than a week against the "moral corruption" and "laxity of women who do not strictly observe wearing the hedjab" (Islamic article of clothing). Since Friday, April 12, groups of young people of the Party of God have been roving on foot and on motorcycles in downtown Tehran, especially around Valis-Has square where there are several fashion boutiques, demanding severe sanctions against those who violate the Islamic moral code. Since most women here strictly observe hedjab, the hexbollahis have been attacking primarily young people whose dress does not in their judgement conform to Islamic norms, in other words, those whose hair is a bit too long or whose blue jeans are a shade too tight.

The Ministry of the Interior and the Islamic committees, which are responsible for maintaining order in Tehran, quickly made it known that the hezbollahis' demonstrations were not authorized and should thus be considered illegal.

To no avail: the processions, which create enormous confusion at certain hours of the afternoon and evening in a downtown Tehran already choked by heavy traffic, continued nearly all week, despite the presence of Islamic committee patrol cars.

According to some witnesses, the latter are more concerned with protecting demonstrators from the anger of passerbys exasperated with the bizarre behavior of the hezbollahis, who sometimes amuse themselves by cutting locks of hair from young people whose dress seems too bold. All of this prompted the Hojjatol-Eslam Elahi, head of the office for the propagation of virtues and the prohibition of vices, to remark that the strange behavior of the hezbollahis was a blot on the revolution: "These kinds of sanctions", he told the newspaper HEYHAN, "can only be ordered by judicial decision."

9825

CSO: 4619/52

IRAN

#### EXPULSION OF REUTER CORRESPONDENT REVOLUTIONARY STEP

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 26 May 85 p 9

[Text] At the end of last week we witnessed a revolutionary step taken by the foreign press and mass media office of the ministry of Islamic guidance. This office announced that the Reuter correspondent in Tehran has been expelled for sending malicious reports from Iran.

In this announcement it was also added that the Reuter correspondent had been notified to leave Iran previously but due to the mediation of Reuter regional officials, he had been granted another opportunity to improve himself. Unfortunately this assistance was useless and he continued to dispatch malicious and baseless news and reports about the Islamic Republic. In congratulating the foreign press and mass media office of the ministry of Islamic Guidance for its decisive expulsion of the Reuter correspondent, we have to emphasize the point that the Islamic Revolution needs more of these realistic actions. Examining those individuals who have been tested many times and who have proved to be traitors in all those tests, is probably not a worthy job. Leniency, forgiveness, and giving another chance to a malicious correspondent who proved by his actions that he has come to this country for spying, and does not have any goals except to betray a revolutionary nation, is expressing a little too many good intentions.

Reuter is a British news agency, and Great Britain is a pioneer of colonization. It has expressed its malicious intentions towards the Islamic Revolution, and has proved its vindictiveness and enmity towards the revolutionary nation of Iran. The fact is, should a colonialistic news agency with its specific aims have representatives in the Islamic Republic of Iran, or not? This question should be discussed, especially when it comes to the correspondent of this news agency which has proved its treachery by its actions. It is not concealed from our nation that the British send their spies under different covers, even as diplomats, to our country in order to pursue their inauspicious colonialistic purposes. In this regard, the responsible authorities of the Islamic Republic must even face the members of the British Embassy in Iran with hesitation, and specially the correspondents of the Colonialistic news agency Reuter, which in principle has established to propagate their colonialistic aims and to misrepresent the existing facts in the countries which are not willing to pay tribute to the satanic powers.

The more important fact is that the ministry of Islamic guidance must confront the other foreign correspondents without complacency and with revolutionary decisiveness. That traitor correspondent who reports the numerous and few

million people of Tehran at the February 1985 ceremony in Azadi Square as fewer than 100,000 or fewer than 10,000 persons and reports the gathering of a few dozen monarchists as thousands or tens of thousands, cannot be a respectable, honest and truthful correspondent. The Islamic Republic is not obliged to tolerate such traitor and liar correspondents. The ministry of Islamic guidance must at the first negative confrontation of a foreign correspondent with Iran revolutionary society affairs, immediately and without any consideration, expel that correspondent and place his name in the black list forever. The ministry of Islamic guidance in this regard must never fear the probably atmosphere creating of broadcasting agencies and Zionist and oppressive propaganda trumpet. A revolution is never able in the course of the continuation of its life to find abject efforts like atmosphere creating and hooliganism as obstacles for itself.

Anyway we can confirm the action of the foreign press and mass media office of the ministry of Islamic guidance in regard to the expulsion of the lie fabricator Reuter correspondent, and we expect that this decisiveness will be continued in a manner which is for the dignity of a real revolution.

9815

CSO: 4640/606

IRAN

**COL SHIRAZI: OPERATIONS COULD NOT BE HAMPERED BY ANY MEANS**

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 1 Jun 85 p 4

[Text] Political Service--In an exclusive interview with ETTELA'AT, Col Sayyad Shirazi, commander of the Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran, while explaining the combat power of Islam's forces in the fray with Iraq's Zionist Ba'thist regime, answered questions by our correspondent concerning the current condition of Iran's combat forces, the future of the war, and the continuation of operations.

In the interview, Col Sayyad Shirazi, pointing out that no temporal or spatial factor can obstruct the continuance of operations by Islam's forces, said: Islam's combat forces are continuing their formidable battle against the Ba'thist forces with their greatest possible force, and God willing, new plans and operations to crush the aggressor will soon be implemented.

**Air Attacks on Cities**

Pointing to Saddam's new plot of announcing a cease-fire during the month of Ramazan followed by rocket and air attacks against our country's cities and residential areas, the army commander said: These actions are an obvious indication of the enemy's weakness and baseness.

Iraq's regime makes use of every period for its plots. If Saddam believes in Islamic law and Islamic matters, then why did he aggress against our Islamic country during the holy months? Our current battle is the performance of our divine duty to crush those aggressing against Islamic territory. The holy law does not raise any obstruction to this from the standpoint of time, and thus we have firmly resisted.

**Crushing the Aggressors**

He said: Taking and possessing the enemy's land and cities in a military fashion was never our aim. Instead, the fundamental goal of Islam's forces was that of crushing the aggressor by means of continuing operations. Right now Islam's forces have critical and important sections of Iraqi soil under their control, which are temporarily being kept. Whenever our mission to crush the aggressor and bring down Saddam is completed successfully, Islam's forces will return to their geographical boundaries. They do not need to stay on the enemy's soil.

He noted: Right now there are border areas which are in the enemy's hands due to the criticality of their elevation, among which we can name "Naftshahr". We hope to cleanse these areas of the defilement of the aggressor Saddamians through the devotion of Islam's soldiers.

#### Badr Operations

Concerning the victorious results of the Badr operations, Col Sayyad Shirazi said: During these operations very critical and important areas fell into the hands of Iran's forces and Islam's soldiers took up position in new areas of the enemy's soil. Furthermore intense blows were inflicted on the Ba'thist enemy. Right now the important and strategic "Basrah-Al-'Amarah" road is completely under the observation and heavy fire of Iran's artillery.

He added: Due to the tactical withdrawal by Iran's forces during one phase of the operations--we left an area where it was not right for us to be--world arrogance's propaganda agencies broadcast many rumors concerning the so-called defeat of Iran in these operations. Not one of these plots and propaganda stratagems of the enemy achieved anything.

He stressed: Islam's combatants are revitalizing themselves so that they can crush the enemy thoroughly with new military operations and plans. God willing, these plans and operations will be implemented soon.

#### Anniversary of Ramazan Operations

Pointing to the anniversary of the Ramazan operations, Col Sayyad Shirazi stressed: The deepest penetration by Islam's forces into the enemy's soil was accomplished during the Ramazan operations, in which Iran's forces advanced more than 27 Kilometres into Iraqi soil and established themselves inside the boundary of the "Katiban" stream. Furthermore, in these operations a vast portion of the enemy's forces were destroyed. There are aerial photographs of the destruction of this vast force.

#### Imposition of Peace

Pointing to the enemy's plots to impose peace, the Army commander said: For some time there have been murmurs of peace and negotiation and ceasefire from the aggressor enemy. However, we explicitly proclaim, just as Islamic republican officials have repeatedly announced, that we will continue our destiny-making battle. These plots have arisen continuously during the imposed war.

Recalling the pride-generating Beit al-Moqqaddas operations and the liberation of Khorramshahr, he said:

Following the operations conquering Khorramshahr, Saddam's regime started provocations in the regions' countries, and began propaganda based on the threat of aggression by the Islamic Republic against its neighbors. But it gained no advantage whatsoever from its lying propaganda.

I personally, as someone who has taken part with Islam's combatants in the battle against the enemy for more than 5 years, feel not even a particle of

fatigue, anxiety or worry in myself. Rather my heart is brimming with hope and expectation of God's great victory which we will soon attain.

The Army commander said: We do not seek war, but the habit of warring against oppression and tyranny is rooted in our being. Wherever they want to oppress and tyrannize us, we will confront them violently, and we are ready for even heavier battles.

He said: During the course of battle, there are many ups and downs. Some times we have conquest and broad victory, and other times we seemingly have defeat and stoppage. However, the best force motivating Islam's force is their endurance and fortitude. The future of the war is exactly what God has promised, meaning victory for Islam's soldiers.

#### Unity of the Combat Forces

Pointing to the unity of the combat forces, Col Sayyad Shirazi said: One of our general concerns throughout the battle was for the unity of Islam's combatants, and the guidance given by the nation's imam as the commander-in-chief. The iron formation of unity throughout the war has displayed the power of the heart-felt belief of our combat forces in the principle of unity and blending. The firmer and stronger this formation becomes, the heavier the blows it inflicts on the enemy.

He noted that as time goes on a more complete order in the organization and harmony of the combat forces will appear in each battle.

#### Self-sufficiency of the Army

Concerning the supply of resources and the effort to achieve self-sufficiency in the army, Col Sayyad Shirazi said: According to the important mission which it holds, the army has a greater presence on the battlefields than any other force or organ. This force's personnel have been positioned for more than 5 years along a 1,200-mile long border. This is a source of pride to the Army of the Islamic republic to thus prove its bond with and love of the Islamic revolution. Along with this constant presence in battle, effective steps have also been taken in the area of self-sufficiency and the supply of resources. The deputy office of the Army self-sufficiency crusade supplies equipment which we test so that we can make better use of it.

#### Glorious Beit al-Moqaddas Operations and the conquest of Khorramshahr,

Concerning the great Beit al-Moqaddas operations and the conquest of Khorramshahr, the Army commander said in conclusion: Each of the battles that Islam's forces has had against its enemy possesses numerous special characteristics, which both now and in the future can be positive and educational experiences for our Islamic movement.

Concerning the positive and constructive experiences of the war one can point to the Beit al-Moqaddas operations.

During these operations, Islam's forces constructed 5 bridges across a river in the shortest possible time, in several hours time, and advanced 25 kilometers deep into the enemy's positions, and reached the "Ahvaz-Khorramshahr" road. During these operations, which took place in an area extending over 5,000 kilometers square, a vast area from the lines of Dezh Iran in "Tala'iyah", "Kushak", "Shalamcheh", "Arvandrud" and "Khorramshahr" was liberated. During 25 days of continuous operations, Islam's forces displayed their superior combat power and ability.

9597

CSO: 4640/607

IRAN

GULF STATES TOLD NOT TO SACRIFICE INTERESTS BECAUSE OF PRESSURE

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 2 Jun 85 p 2

[Text] Kuwait - IRNA - Dr Ali Shams Ardakani, the special envoy of the minister of foreign affairs to the gulf states, in an interview yesterday at noon with the IRNA reporter in Kuwait, called the purpose of his trip to the Arab states of the Persian Gulf a following up of mutual affairs, and to inform the foreign ministers of the states of the southern borders of the Persian Gulf about improvements in mutual relations. In this interview, Ardakani referred to his visit with the foreign ministers of the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait and mentioned that the foreign ministers of these countries have acknowledged that mutual relations of the neighboring states also includes strategic relations. Secondary questions which are not related to the mutual relations of the two nations must not be considered as factors to determine the relations of the two nations.

He added: "Giving priority to secondary questions in mutual relations sometimes creates the impression that Iran's relations with its neighboring states in the region are gloomy. Evidently this is the impression of those whose stability and mutual relations with the states in the region disturbs their immediate and future political, military or economic interests in the region."

He added: "In this respect, the U.S., Israel, and their other new and old agents are at the top of the list. From the beginning of their aggressive war against the Islamic Republic of Iran we have witnessed their hypocritic, terroristic and discordant stand and activities in the region. These activities were received as opposition to the Islamic Republic of Iran and also was continued in other regions in the form of terror, pressure, tributes, and foolish and wicked propaganda."

In the continuation of his talk, the special envoy of the minister of foreign affairs said in regard to the discussed questions during his visits with the Kuwaiti foreign minister: "In our meeting with the Kuwaiti foreign minister, in addition to the discussion about the recent events in the region, we discussed and talked about our mutual relations, and the means to protect the consular rights of the citizens of Iran residing in Kuwait based on international laws. The foreign minister of Kuwait has promised cooperation in this regard."

Ardakani in regard to the recent plots of Iraq for disturbing the good relations of the Islamic Republic of Iran with the Gulf states said: "We believe that the conspirators in the long run will damage their own interests too, and in reality this indicates our enemies stupidity. The gulf states definitely are aware of these matters and they must not sacrifice their nation's interests because of pressures, uproars, terrors, and plots. We are sure they do not intend to do that."

Mr Ardakani at the conclusion of his talks about the terroristic projects of Iraq in the region referred to the criminal record of Saddam in the history of terrorism in the region and said: "The nation of Iran is not afraid of Saddam's terrorism. A nation which is not afraid of "Reagan's" terrorism and knows how to confront it, knows how to confront the new terrorism of the criminal Saddam." He added: "The Islamic Republic of Iran which was able to give a knockout answer to the preplanned terroristic attack of the Iraqi regime can evidently decisively answer the rest of their other terroristic actions."

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CSO: 4640/605

PAKISTAN

BUREAUCRACY SAID TO PROMOTE SINDHI SEPARATIST MOVEMENT

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 8 May 85 p 3

[Article by Abdul Karim Abid: "New and Old Relations between Bureaucracy and Jiye Sindh Movement"]

[Text] The leader of the Jiye Sindh movement, G.M. Sayyed, has nominated Mrs Hamida Khoru as his successor, but her leadership has not been accepted by everybody connected with the movement. As a matter of fact, G.M. Sayyed has been a leader only in name. Many different groups of people, often with contradictory aims, called themselves followers of the Jiye Sindh movement and received orders and money from wherever they could get it. We can say this about G.M. Sayyed, that he has never compromised on the principle of Sindhi nationalism and has made sacrifices for his ideal. But other exponents of Sindhi nationalism have all been opportunists. For the sake of their own personal gains they compromised with Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and General Ziaul Haq. G.M. Sayyed is a staunch Sindhi nationalist and does not believe in Pakistan, but he allows other Sindhi leaders to make compromises if it helps them to achieve their purposes. That is how men like Mr Ghulam Mustafa Shah, the Rashidi brothers and Ayub Khoru managed to please G.M. Sayyed while all the time they cooperated with the bureaucracy and the military rulers. It looks strange, but it is true. Mrs Hamida Khoru, too, is a partner in the secret alliance between the Jiye Sindh movement and the bureaucracy.

Now the question arises: What does the bureaucracy get from the Jiye Sindh movement? Well, the first gain is: "Divide and rule." Jiye Sindh is a handy slogan for that purpose. Secondly, the rulers need a "bogey" to frighten the public just as parents need a bogey to control their naughty children. Whenever people clamor for democracy, the rulers say, "How can you talk about such a thing when the very existence of the country is in danger?" At such a time the slogan of Jiye Sindh proves to be very useful. The Sindhi problem has been aggravated by the bureaucracy for its own ends. The Jiye Sindh crowd makes trouble at a signal from the rulers and shouts, "Long live G.M. Sayyed," while the old gentleman is under permanent house arrest and knows nothing about what is happening. The rulers put up the show only to frighten the public and say "The genie of the Jiye Sindh is in the bottle, but once it is out nobody will be able to put it back." This is their method not only of keeping the immigrants, Punjabis, Pathans and patriotic Sindhis in control,

but also of frightening Punjab, the largest and most powerful province of Pakistan.

Another way in which Jiye Sindh is useful for the bureaucracy is that, by referring to it, they can curb the demand for democracy. It is also an anti-dote for the People's Party. With its help Sindh can be alienated from the nationwide demand for the restoration of the 1973 Constitution. The People's Party cannot come into power in Sindh because it has to fight against the curse of the Jiye Sindh movement. Thus the Jiye Sindh hooligans make mischief with the help of the bureaucracy. None of these trouble-makers, however, have ever won an election either in an educational institution or in politics. The only student groups that have ever won an election in Sindh have been the [Sindh] People's Student Federation, Islami Jamiat-e Tulba and the National Student Federation. The Jiye Sindh Student Organization has never won an election. In the same way, no candidate from the Jiye Sindh Group was elected in the 1970 elections or any subsequent elections. This falsifies the argument of the bureaucracy that democracy and elections would strengthen this movement. The fact of the matter is that the Jiye Sindh movement (which has been nourished by the suffocation caused by martial law and aggravated by the conspiracy of the bureaucrats) will disappear from the scene completely, and its place will be taken by political parties that have their roots in Sindh as well as in Punjab. Democracy will bring to the forefront political parties that have national and not regional objectives. This is not to say that Sindhi nationalism is a myth and has no following at all. In fact the credit for Jiye Sindh should go to the undemocratic rule of martial law and not to the leaders of this movement. Under a democratic government, too, contradictions arise, but they are resolved through democratic methods. If political parties are allowed to work freely, they try to present programs that would be acceptable in the whole country, and not in one particular province or for one particular group. This leads to the resolution of all political contradictions, and a just and acceptable method of government methods. If political parties are allowed to work freely, they try to present programs that would be acceptable in the whole country, and not in one particular province or for one particular group. This leads to the resolution of all political contradictions, and a just and acceptable method of government is discovered.

Unluckily, our bureaucracy does not like a national platform where Sindhis, Punjabis, Pakhtuns and Baluchis join hands and work together. It prefers to have the slogans of Jiye Sindh, Alzulfiqar and confederation disrupt the work of all national political parties. It blames the Jiye Sindh movement for all the trouble engineered by itself. Some people, for temporary gains, join the bureaucrats in making mischief in the province. The bureaucracy, by its policy of "divide and rule" has brought the country to the verge of disaster. Only free democratic activity can save us.

The bureaucrats want to have antagonistic powers in the province in order to use one against the other. They find the situation expedient for their own narrow aims, but we have wider interests of the whole country at heart and want popular political parties to rise and make policies to unite the nation for the good of the whole country. As for the leadership of Mrs Hamida Khoru,

she can never become a leader in Sindh, despite all the backing she gets from the bureaucracy, not to mention taking the place of Miss Benazir Bhutto. She will not even be accepted by all the fighting factions of the Jiye Sindh movement. She will not be able to control the impulsive, obstinate and aggressive students. It would be better for her to join a national movement. By joining the Jiye Sindh movement she will fail to achieve anything either for Sindh or for Pakistan. The bureaucracy will only use her for demanding the abolition of the 1973 Constitution and causing a rift between Sindhis and non-Sindhis. After she has served their purpose, she will find her place in the trash can. Mr Pliju of the Sindh National Front has proved to be wiser than she. He became an adherent of the MRD without losing his connection with Sindh nationalism.

G.M. Sayyed and the Jiye Sindh Front condemned the MRD when it led a strong agitation in Sindh. That is one reason why the bureaucracy and Jiye Sindh came nearer to each other, and also why top officials keep visiting Mr G.M. Sayyed. Mr Jatoi says that G.M. Sayyed has been the secret agent of every regime that has ruled the country and now, too, is working at a signal from the government. Mr Jatoi further says that the Sayyed Sahib is taking the part of the present chief minister of Sindh, Mr. Ghaus Ali Shah, because the latter is a Sayyed. It sounds strange, but it is true that the Sayyed Sahib has founded a Sayyed association, the purpose being to organize the Sayyeds of Sindh.

But the membership is open only to the Sindhi-speaking Sayyeds. This association used to have its meetings off and on, but now the meetings are taking place regularly. In this association every Sayyed is asked to help every other Sayyed without reference to his preferences. That is why (according to Mr Jatoi) Mr Ghaus Ali Shah, the chief minister of Sindh, is in the good books of Mr G.M. Sayyed. We do not accept Mr Jatoi's view about Mr G.H. Sayyed's being the agent of every ruling regime, still we know there is a secret connection between the Jiye Sindh movement and the bureaucracy. Each has its own axe to grind. At present their common purpose is to get the 1973 Constitution abolished and have the country involved in the search for a new constitution.

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CSO: 4656/138

PAKISTAN

WALI KHAN: PAKISTAN'S FUTURE HANGS ON HEALTH OF FOUR ESTATES

Karachi JANG in Urdu 15 May 85 Magazine pp 2-4

[Report on public affairs forum with Wali Khan among panelists, moderated by Nizam Siddiqi]

[Excerpts] Nizam Siddiqi: We are grateful to you, Khan Abdul Wali Khan, for agreeing to take part in our JANG forum on very short notice and to express your views on national issues. I welcome you and your comrades. The topics on which we wish to talk today include the overall national situation, future effects of the constitutional amendments and these expectations and fears which are being aired in and out of the government.

We want to know how you view the future of Pakistan in the context of the present situation. First you express your views and then we will pose questions.

Wali Khan: You have asked for my opinion of the future. For the strength of any democratic country or for the welfare and unity of its people, four institutions are considered basic pillars. Without these four pillars, the structure of government cannot stand and, in the absence of these basic pillars, the rest of the structure becomes untenable. Among these basic pillars, first, is the law-making body which we call parliament. It writes the constitution, frames laws and confers on citizens their basic rights.

The second pillar is the judiciary, which guarantees protection of the laws made by parliament and the rights conferred upon the people under the law. It protects your rights and the rights of the people uniformly and fearlessly. Whenever any person is deprived of his rights, he can knock on the doors of the judiciary and obtain justice.

The third pillar is administration, which enforces the laws.

The fourth pillar is the press, which acts as a watchdog. If anyone is in trouble or if anyone cannot have his say, he can approach the press.

Now we will examine the status and condition of these four basic institutions in the present set-up of Pakistan. Long ago, I was asked the same question by

General Ziaul Haq. I submitted to him: "The parliament, of which we were members and which had created a consensus constitution, was dismissed by Mr Bhutto. The elections that Mr Bhutto conducted were set aside by you. Thus the parliament, the first pillar of the country, was done away with. As for the second pillar, the judiciary, its decline began in the Bhutto regime and the PCO [Provisional Constitution Order] demolished it.

Let me relate an interesting anecdote concerning the judiciary. We were appearing before Mr Justice Humudur Rehman. It is known as the NAP Reference Case; but, in fact, it was a Pakistan Federation case that we were fighting. During its hearing, the late Justice Humudur Rehman, addressing me, said in a very lofty manner, "I stand for the rule of law, Wali Khan." I asked: "Do you really mean it? Have you heard of a town in Sind called Sanghar. There the session judge has been handcuffed under the portrait of Quaide-Azam and in full court. You say you stand for the administration of law. Have you protested over this incident? Has anyone of your respected judges and lawyers who are present here protested? No, sir, you cannot do this. It is we who protested over this regrettable incident both in and out of the parliament. So if I say that I stand for the rule of law, it is correct and based on fact, but when you make this claim you have no evidence to sustain it." I said then that a judiciary which cannot protect its judges cannot safeguard rights and administer justice. So the pillar of justice in national life is not there anymore.

The story of administration is the same. Those who enforce the law have been subjected to such treatment that their condition today is worse than that of domestic servants. A process of dismissals was started wherein even those who had retired or died 4 years ago were discredited. Thus by undermining trust and confidence in administration, even this pillar was demolished.

Now let us consider the last and fourth pillar, the press. This foremost institution of democracy has this distinction in the world--that it dethroned a powerful and elected president like President Nixon. But it is sad to note that in this country the press is helpless and powerless. There is no parallel to the number of restrictions placed on it. If it escapes one, it is subject to the second, and if it escapes the second, it is liable to the third, and on top of that comes martial law, supreme and overwhelming everyone. Thus even this means and institution of filing grievances is finished.

The future of any civilized country and any society where there is rule of law can be judged by its lawmaking body, its judiciary and administration, and the press. In our country all four of these institutions are non-existent, and it should not be difficult to predict the future. So long as these four basic institutions are not restored, any judgment about the country's future is nothing more than wishful and ignorant thinking.

Now let us have a look at the condition of the constitution. Let me tell you an incident about the creation and enforcement of the 1973 constitution. In 1973 when we assembled to write the constitution, we gave a blank check to the Peoples Party. We did not give the Peoples Party a blank check to formulate the constitution because we were afraid or were cowed down. Nor did we do so out of any wheeling and dealing. The speech I made in parliament at that time is still on record. Addressing Mr Bhutto I said: "I'm giving you my vote of

confidence even though I have no confidence in you." On this occasion I also said, "We are giving this blank check of a vote of confidence because our country is dismembered, 90,000 of our troops are in the prison of our enemy, and this country is not in a position stand another confrontation."

Then I related a Pashto anecdote. A person was carrying a load of glass bangles on a donkey. A ruffian came and, hitting the load with a stick asked, "What are you carrying?" He got the reply: "Hit once again and it is nothing." I said, "Pakistan has been hit once. It cannot stand another blow."

There is a limit to cooperation, sir. You may remember that in the NAP constitution it is stated that with the exception of four departments--foreign affairs, defense, communications and currency, all departments would be in the hands of the provinces. But while formulating the 1973 constitution we did not insist on it. I accepted the 1973 constitution in violation of the instructions of my party. I did this not for any personal gain but in the national interest. We made such sacrifices for the sake of this country. We made a constitution. It is fruitless to go into the details of what became of this constitution. The day martial law was imposed in the country, that day the 1973 constitution breathed its last. Then PCO was imposed. In one country you cannot have two constitutions. In this country either PCO will remain or the 1973 constitution. But at this time there is PCO, there is the 1973 constitution and there is the martial law.

This is possible only in our country. In my opinion there is no constitution at all. We know that 12 August [announcement] came, [later] a referendum was held. Where is all this found in the 1973 constitution? Where are partyless elections mentioned in the 1973 constitution? After the amendments even the concept of constitution has changed. Now the parliamentary system itself has disappeared. The present system is neither presidential, nor parliamentary, but simply martial law, and efforts are under way to find some justification for it. That is why our view right from the beginning has been that the 1973 constitution is finished.

According to the 1973 constitution, if anyone has the authority to make amendments, it is only the assembly or the parliament which has been created as a result of elections held in a manner sanctioned by the 1973 constitution. We cannot grant this authority to any single individual. Even if a single person has some legal or constitutional justification, we do not recognize it. The present regime has no legal standing. Its position is that for the last 8 years it has ruled the country by means of martial law. Now by momentum, or as the president has himself said, he will remain president under the constitution and he will become president through parliamentary vote.

What was the significance of the 19 December announcement of a referendum? It meant that he [Zia] did not accept the office of Chief Martial Law Administrator. He voluntarily gave up the office of CMLA. He went to the people, but we maintain that the people did not give him a mandate and that he has absolutely no right to play with the constitution.

Our stand is that there is no constitution in the country and the order restoring the constitution is adding insult to injury. The constitution which has been dead for 8 years has been dug out of its grave and systematically

deprived of all its distinguishing features. A few persons support you and describe the changes as trivial. But after having performed the last rites of the constitution, what are you doing to it now? This can be answered only by those who know how to infuse life into this lifeless frame. We are prepared to call it a 1985 constitution, because they have produced something new which has lost all its distinguishing marks. We do not grant the authority to amend. This issue is closed.

Now when mention is made of supremacy of the law, under the PCO itself the resolutions and objectives of the PCO are cited as [statutes of] authority. Whatever excesses they have committed with the country have thus been legitimized. Now the rulers say that you can make any amendments but only with the permission of the president. This is wonderful. After the formation of parliament, he gets unlimited powers. In my opinion the most dangerous aspect of this process has been the change in federal structure, and that is a great tragedy. The policy of the rulers all along has been to think of this country in terms of separate provinces and to deal with them accordingly. They always had the view that this was Punjab and that was Bengal, and so on.

Now let us consider the amendments. Under the constitution of President Ziaul Haq, the procedure for election of the president has been changed. Now along with the parliament the provinces will vote for the president. If the provinces vote, it means that the president will always bag 63 percent of the votes. This means that, if there is a president, he will be from Punjab. Now let us consider the powers of the president. According to his constitution he will nominate governors, army commanders and chief ministers. This goes even beyond "One Unit" which we have been fighting against all along.

We talk of politics. We talk of democracy. If these methods fail in solving the nation's problems, what will the people think? It is natural that, if you prohibit constitutional methods, people will either give in or they will resort to unconstitutional means. If you bar legal approaches, then only one way will be left and that will be the way of lawlessness and violence. If, God forbid, this happens, then this country will suffer the same fate as Iran and Afghanistan.

If I am shouting at the top of my voice in an effort to warn you of dangers, am I doing it for any personal interest? No, sir. What attraction can there be for me now? Which ministry can't I get? Twice I have been invited to become prime minister. Mr Bhutto offered me the presidency, but I declined.

The situation is like this. The rules are at the wheel and we, bound hands and feet, are in the passenger seat. We scream at them: 'Look out, you are going in a ditch, you will kill yourself and kill us too', but they shut us up. I have come to Karachi after an interval of several years and this is because I was not permitted to come here.

Question: Khan Sahib, the East Pakistan issue is settled. It is now Bangladesh, an independent and sovereign state. The real question is of present Pakistan. How do you view Pakistan's future?

Answer: I have said that the future can be judged only when the four basic institutions are strong and their status is respected. Otherwise there is no

future. Provincialism is not something recent. This attitude has been propagated by those who consider themselves as from a big province. So long as the four provinces are not given equal rights, a feeling of equality and equal shares, the future of the country will remain shaky. This requires broadmindedness which is missing here.

Question: If under the given geographical and other conditions, the feeling of deprivation grows among the masses, can the rest of the country survive?

Answer: That is what we are saying: please don't break up. What will be the consequence if you keep on dividing? First we were punished because we opposed the partition of India. Then we were punished because we opposed division of Pakistan. Now we are perhaps being punished because we suggest that the rest of Pakistan be saved. The country has to stay; it is transient.

Question: These days reports of a Sindi-Baluch-Pakhtoon Front are being published. Won't formation of such a front harm the country? If such a front has to be formed then these people should come to Pakistan and form the front here so that they may better explain their point of view to the masses. Despite your thousands of differences you have never raised such an issue. Whatever you had to say, you said it, and said it aloud, in the country. In your view, is this demand and the choice of its place and timing correct? In your opinion, won't it do further harm? Moreover, this front is a clear confrontation against Punjab. It will create tension. Because of past tensions the country broke up. Can we afford another fragmentation of the country?

Answer: Consider all the factors that gave rise to the front. After all, why was it necessary? My friend, till now people had the hope that the supremacy of the constitution and the law would be restored, that elections would be held, that public opinion would be invited and its wishes respected, and that later those elected representatives who formed assemblies would carry out the constitutional amendments they considered appropriate in the light of the wishes and aspirations of the people. But this did not happen. In disregard of the constitution, the referendum was held and, in contravention of the constitution, partyless elections were held.

Through unilateral amendments, they have changed beyond recognition the constitution, which had been drafted by the elected representatives of the people who had reached agreement by burying their differences in the wider interests of the country. Anyway, what you said is the result of this. Now people have seen through the political scheme. They were asked: "Are you Muslims and do you have faith in Islam? If so, then for the next 5 years I will be your president." What else could have been the result of this? I have said before that the way the president was elected has produced among the people a feeling of deprivation. Next time the president will be elected by the parliament as well as by the provinces.

This means that the president from the province with 63 percent of the population will always prevail over the country and his power will be unlimited and of such a nature that the three provinces with 37 percent of the population will always be dependent on him. By this, the concept of federation has been completely eroded. The other question is that instead of forming a front

abroad they should have formed a front within the country. Why are they abroad? Well, for the last 8 years political activity in this country has been branded a crime. Politics is banned.

You know better than I what restrictions there are on you. You and I are aware of the restrictions on the judiciary. Consider when there are such restrictions and you close all avenues, when within the country a Sindhi cannot go to Punjab, a Punjabi cannot travel to the Frontier Province, a man from the Frontier Province cannot enter Baluchistan Province and a man from Baluchistan cannot go to Sind, how will national unity grow? You are forcing people to go and live in their respective provinces, think of their provinces; then who will think of Pakistan? Today a Pashtoon thinks of himself as a Pashtoon. A Baluchi thinks in terms of Baluchistan. A man from Sind is compelled to think in terms of a Sindhi. He does not think in terms of Pakistan because he is not given an opportunity to think in terms of Pakistan. When they cannot tolerate even personal relationships and social customs, who will create relationships of unity? It appears as though all this is being done deliberately.

Question: It looks as though they will not accept your suggestions. But what are your suggestions regarding Pakistan's future?

Answer: We believe that unless you strengthen and restore the four basic institutions in Pakistan as a whole, there is no future for Pakistan. Secondly, so long as units of your federation continue to be told, as they have been told for the last 38 years, that no Pakistani lives here, only Bengalis live here, Punjabis live there, a Baluchi lives here and a Pathan lives there, this system will not last long. To save this country you will have to produce a conscious feeling of commonness. Unless the feeling is created that this is your country and you have an equal share in running this country, then this country has no future. If the country continues to be run as it has been, then I believe that, in view of the area and the region and the kind of foreign policy we have, we are moving in the direction of Iran and Afghanistan. When every way is closed, people will on their own adopt the path of revolution and that will lead to the country's ruin.

Question: Concerning the recent elections, regardless of how they were conducted, was it not voting and did it not express the people's opinion? Had you taken part in it, would it not have furthered the political process? In your view, did not the MRD [Movement for the Restoration of Democracy] make a mistake in boycotting the elections and was not this boycott a failure?

Answer: Not at all. First you explain this: Who told you that the MRD boycotted it? Restrictions were placed on the MRD and it could not take part in the elections. It is another matter how you report it or how people take interest in it. The point is that there is a boycott when I offer you a plate and you refuse to accept it. When no one is offering you a plate, how can you decline it? I have my arms folded and you say you won't take it. When I am not offering you anything, how will you take anything? This is not a boycott. How can this be a boycott? One day a person got into an argument with me. He said, "At least you must acknowledge that there were no irregularities" [in elections]. I asked, "What are the irregularities committed for?" Obviously to defeat your opponents, to throw them out of the arena. They threw us out even before the elections. What was the need for irregularities? You can

call it elections, but we are not prepared to accept them. Elections have their own rules, disciplines and principles. If you do not abide by a single principle and yet claim that you are holding elections, then you may call them elections. However, the world will not call them elections.

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PAKISTAN

EDITORIAL CALLS FOR END TO STREET VIOLENCE

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 27 May 85 p 3

[Editorial] [Text] Karachi had hardly heaved a sigh of relief from the long round of rioting, arson, unrest and curfew and the situation was barely returning to normal when it once again flared up. It has become clear that there are some elements who are on no account prepared to let the city live in peace and who are determined to create unrest on one pretext or the other. It is true that at the moment Karachi is in the grip of misfortunes. On the one hand, there is severe heat and it is the holy month of Ramazan and on the other hand, sometimes there is no water and sometimes there is no electricity and at other times both are unavailable. All this has rendered the life of the citizens miserable. But this has been the case most of the time. This time, however, it looks as though this unrest and suppressed anger is being systematically incited and directed into one channel. Nowadays whatever happens in the city, the victims are transport vehicles or public servants. Earlier, on 15 April, on the excuse of a traffic accident, business life in the city was brought to a halt. There was bloodshed, and anti-social elements had a field day looting. There was bad blood between brothers and this enmity has not completely disappeared or is not allowed to disappear. This is so because the interest of certain elements lies in the absence of unity among Muslims. Now, during the past 3 to 4 days, the shortage of water and electricity has been used to create disturbances in the affected areas, and law and order is being disrupted. Once again the familiar pattern of stone throwing, burning of vehicles and disruption of traffic has resumed. As a result, many poor people have lost their means of livelihood and the vehicles of countless people have been destroyed. Some people went still further and, taking the law into their hands, did not refrain from threatening to take employees of the Water and Sewage Board hostage or even to kill them. KES (Karachi Electricity Supply) offices were attacked. One person's motorcycle was burnt, fire was set to another's car or some poor rickshaw taxi wallah was deprived of his means of livelihood which who knows how he had deprived himself to obtain. Repercussions of the attacks on rickshaw taxis and minibuses are appearing now. Once again it is feared that the real aim of those who incite unrest over and over again is that, on one hand, there should be conflict between the administration and the public and, on the other hand, hatred and differences between different classes should be created so that advantage can be taken of them at any time in the future.

For the last 40 days public peace in the city has been disrupted. Law has been made a laughing stock. During these days over 300 vehicles including buses, minibuses and rickshaws have been burnt or destroyed. Since 15 April it has become the routine that whenever there is any accident, people take the law into their hands and set fire to the vehicle involved. After disturbances in the entire city that followed the 15 April accident it was expected that the operators of buses and minibuses would lie low. But surprisingly enough, instead of dropping, traffic accidents have gone up. Now it is observed that, following these accidents or even without these accidents, certain known faces appear on the scene and buses, minibuses and so forth are set on fire.

It has been observed in the last 3 to 4 days that, during demonstrations against the shortage of water and electricity, mostly rickshaws have been burnt, even though rickshaws contribute very little to road accidents. In particular, fatal accidents involving rickshaws are rare. What is more, owners of rickshaws are not rich people or transporters. When they suffer losses, they in turn retaliate. The result is that in large parts of the city there is no public transport, and people going to work in the morning or those returning home in time for breakfast face serious problems.

The transport strike is due to stone throwing. We fail to understand the connection between a shortage or breakdown in the supply of water and electricity and the buses and rickshaws. It is clear from this that the real reason for the disturbances is not shortage of water and electricity or accidents. It is part of a well thought-out plan and it appears as though even in the bureaucracy there are supporters of these elements. Otherwise, what is the reason that this disorder has not been curbed? As a result of it, class hatred is growing and not only rioting but, in many parts of the city, murderous attacks are taking place. KES officials maintain that there is plenty of electricity for the city and no loadshedding is taking place. Then why is it that in one part of the city there is no electricity for 6 to 7 days at a stretch and even when the supply is restored after protests and riots it is frequently disrupted? If it is because of technical reasons then these defects should have been rectified by now. Protests or demonstrations do not result from isolated or accidental breakdowns. The same is true of the water supply. There are many areas where water is not supplied for days on end. What is the justification for this? Has not a deliberate attempt been made to upset people this way? Clearly anti-social elements are taking advantage of this unhappiness.

We have had enough of rioting, unrest, looting, vandalism and lawlessness. This situation cannot be tolerated any longer. The majority of citizens are peace-loving and, when conditions in the city deteriorate, it is these peaceful citizens who suffer harassment. We would appeal to these citizens not to strengthen the hands of anti-social elements and not to take the law into their own hands. Otherwise, such rioting could erupt as will be very difficult to control. A stone thrown at a bus or rickshaw in a frivolous spirit or in fun can pose an insurmountable obstacle in the path of peace. The administration too should come to its senses and give up its attitude of

overlooking anti-social elements. Chief minister Sayyad Gauss Ali Shah has well said that the despicable aims of those who want to create dissensions between different sections of society will be severely crushed and, in order to maintain peace, black sheep will be severely dealt with. Action should be taken on it and no one should be permitted to take the law into his own hands.

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END